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'Roundup' on Reaction to Soviet Arms Proposal
OW1307113788 Beijing XINHUA in English
0821 GMT 13 Jul 88

[“Roundup: Gorbachev Arms Proposal Draws Mixed Reviews in Western Europe (by Xiaong Changyi)”—XINHUA headline]

[Text] Beijing, July 13 (XINHUA)—The surprising offer made by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to withdraw a number of Soviet jet fighters from Eastern Europe in exchange for Italy not deploying 72 American F-16 fighter bombers has drawn mixed reviews throughout Western Europe.

Gorbachev made the proposal during a speech before the Polish Parliament in Warsaw Monday, where he is on a six-day official visit.

He also proposed a summit of the heads of government of Eastern and Western Europe on the issue of conventional arms limitation.

Italian Prime Minister Ciriaco de Mita welcomed Gorbachev's proposal. In a press release in Rome, he said Gorbachev's offer "completely confirms the validity for peace and disarmament of Italy's decision to host the F-16s on its territory."

"The Soviet Union, with the realism and the intelligence that marks its present politics, realized that requests for unilateral disarmament are unacceptable and that, to avoid the transfer of the F-16s on the southern flank of NATO, the only way is to confront the problem of balanced conventional disarmament in Europe."

De Mita also said that Italy, in consultation with the United States and the other NATO allies, is ready to make every effort to achieve a balanced reduction in conventional arms.

But Manfred Woerner, secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in a statement issued in Brussels, rebuffed the offer, saying NATO's priority was to cut land forces.

"We are committed to establishing a stable and secure balance of conventional forces at the lowest levels in Europe," he said. "A focus on aircraft does not meet this central requirement."

"We need asymmetrical reductions, notably in tanks and artillery, in order to eliminate the most worrying disparities," he said.

"On their own, aircraft do not capture and hold territory, a threat of particular concern to NATO," he continued. "Further, the difficulties of verification are compounded by the ability to redeploy air forces quickly from one theatre to another."

The Western alliance has also given a cool response to Gorbachev's proposal on a pan-European summit on reduction of conventional forces stationed in Europe.

In the Hague, a Dutch Foreign Ministry spokesman said Gorbachev's pan-European summit proposal "seemed to leave out the United States and Canada."

"That's not the way we discuss stability and security in Europe. When speaking of conventional stability in Europe and lowering of conventional levels, we have the so-called conventional stability talks in Vienna. That's where we should come to terms," he said.

He added, "We don't want a decoupling between us and our allies at the other side of the (Atlantic) Ocean."

The multi-balanced troop reduction (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna began in October 1973. It has produced little progress in the past 15 years.

In London, a Foreign Office spokesman said that the British Government would study Gorbachev's proposals "carefully," but added "the place where we believe there should be negotiations and reduction in conventional imbalance is Vienna."

Volker Ruehe, arms expert for the German Christian Democratic Union and Christian Socialist Union, said a forum for talks on troop reduction in Europe already exists and "we don't need to create a new forum."

Although the Soviet proposal is encouraging and indicates more willingness to consider Western security interests, Soviet sincerity in reducing conventional forces has yet to be tested, " he said.

However, opposition leaders in Federal Germany said the proposals should be taken seriously.

During a visit to the Luxeuil-les-Bains Air Base in Eastern France, President Francois Mitterrand said Gorbachev's proposal is "interesting," and added that certain political conditions must be met before he would consider commenting upon the proposal.

However, he did not rule out the possibility of a kind of decoupling between Europe and the United States.

The French president also reaffirmed that he would give priority to the realization of a reduction in conventional arms in Europe.

Public opinion in Western Europe agreed that Gorbachev's twin proposals seemed to represent another media victory in his propaganda drive.

However, some Western European leaders expressed the worry that Soviet foreign policy towards Europe was aimed primarily at "decoupling" NATO's European allies from the United States and Canada.

USSR Proposes Plan for Missile Inspection
*OW2407014188 Beijing XINHUA in English
0027 GMT 24 Jul 88*

[Text] Washington, July 23 (XINHUA)—U.S. and Soviet inspectors will be allowed unprecedented access to each other's bomber bases, strategic naval ports and military ships under a newly-unveiled plan by the Soviets for verifying limits on nuclear-armed Cruise missiles.

According to THE WASHINGTON POST today, the proposal calls for permanently stationing teams of U.S. and Soviet inspectors outside factories in each other's countries where Cruise missiles are produced, where their warheads are installed and where the weapons are loaded onto submarines and other ships.

The Soviet plan also calls for periodic inspection of military bases where long-range aircraft are equipped with Cruise missiles, and short-notice inspections of unrelated sites where Cruise missiles are strongly suspected of being illegally stored.

The plan was disclosed by Soviet Foreign Ministry Disarmament Chief Viktor Karpov and senior arms control adviser on the military's General Staff Col. Gen. Nikolay Chervov in separate interviews with the POST.

The Soviet officials said that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev still wants to sign, with President Ronald Reagan, an agreement on a 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear arms (START), which includes these inspection rights to verify each side's compliance.

The officials said the Reagan administration has thus far blocked the plan because of Naval and Air Forces' resistance to the proposed Soviet inspections.

The Soviet officials called on Reagan to "make a political decision" in the next six weeks to overrule the military on the question of a strategic arms agreement.

The United States and the Soviet Union have sharp differences over the air- and sea-launched Cruise missile issue, related to the START agreement which is under negotiation.

The United States, which is ahead of the Soviet Union in the development, production and deployment of Cruise missiles, maintains that the weapons should not be tightly limited because they are far less threatening than ballistic missiles. It also argues that the relatively small missiles can be secretly produced and illegally stored aboard ships and submarines, or in warehouses.

But the Soviet Union strongly rejects both views of the United States. Soviet officials indicated that they will rather pursue a strategic arms treaty with Reagan's successor than sign one that lacks tight Cruise missile constraints.

The Soviet Union recently proposed a ceiling of 1,000 sea-launched Cruise missiles, allowing each side to decide how many will be equipped with nuclear warheads, Karpov was quoted as saying.

Moscow also proposed that U.S. strategic bombers be counted as carrying the maximum possible number of air-launched Cruise missiles.

Commentary Views U.S., USSR Nuclear Strategies

*HK3007081388 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
29 Jul 88 p 6*

[Special commentary by Chen Feng and Zhai Zihai: "Readjustments of the U.S., Soviet Nuclear Strategies, and Their Backgrounds"]

[Text] Since the beginning of the 1980's, some markedly different characteristics have surfaced in the U.S. and Soviet strategies for their military buildup: On the one hand, both the United States and the Soviet Union are conducting disarmament of their offensive strategic nuclear capabilities. On the other, they have both stepped up their strategic defense system with offensive functions. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are stepping up the most important postwar readjustment of their nuclear strategies.

The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy

Nuclear weapons have always been an important factor for the United States and the Soviet Union in formulating their national security strategies since the late 1940s, when the United States first possessed nuclear weapons. The emergence of nuclear weapons has exerted great influence on the evolution of the postwar world situation.

Over the past 40 years or so, the development of U.S. and Soviet nuclear capabilities and their balance of strength has largely gone through three stages along with relative changes in their nuclear strategies.

The period between the early postwar days and the early 1950s was one of U.S. nuclear monopoly; the United States pursues the strategy of "all-round containment" toward the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet Union broke through the U.S. nuclear monopoly between the early 1950s and 1960s, the United States continued to possess more powerful nuclear advantages, pursued the so-called "large-scale retaliation" strategy, and asserted that should the Soviet Union launch an offensive, the United States would employ its nuclear advantages, and carry out large-scale retaliation. With the rapid development of Soviet nuclear capabilities in the mid-1960s, the balance of U.S. and Soviet nuclear capabilities gradually took shape; U.S. nuclear strategy gradually evolved "assuring mutual destruction" and its focus began to shift on possessing reliable second strike capabilities, namely the shift to nuclear deterrents.

The Soviet Union, thinking itself in the lead in rocket technology between the early 1950s and 1960s, during which period the U.S. nuclear monopoly was broken, believed that the fate of war would be determined by strategic weapons, regarding "rocket nuclear strategy" as the most important part of its military strategy, in seeking equal status with the United States. However, because the Soviet Union was still inferior to the United States in its nuclear capabilities and total military strength, this strategy was terminated with the fall of Khrushchev. The Soviet Union stepped up the expansion of its nuclear capabilities between the mid-1960s and late 1970s, gradually establishing the concept of "being prepared to fight a nuclear as well as a regular war" in its strategic thinking; and sought nuclear advantages based on victory in a nuclear war.

Readjustment in the 1980s

The U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategy basically consisted of three component parts: nuclear deterrents, the employment, and development of nuclear capabilities. Since the beginning of the 1980s, important changes have taken place in U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategies in these three aspects along with the surfacing of some common development trends.

First, there has been some evolution in the thinking of the relationship between deterrents and actual war. Nuclear weapons have tremendous destructive quality and strategic nuclear weapons have always been regarded as "the last resort" in their military strategies. With the gradual shaping of the U.S.-Soviet balance in nuclear capabilities, the factor of nuclear deterrents has gradually extended. Prior to the 1980s, the factor of actual war took up the major role in U.S. and Soviet military strategies. However, since the 1980s, the United States and Soviet Union have gradually given up the thinking that nuclear weapons would win a war, believing that nuclear war should not be fought and that no victory would be possible. The changes on the part of the Soviet Union were even more obvious. It has explicitly pointed out that "a nuclear war is not likely to bring political benefits to anybody," and "no distinction between victors and losers can be made should a nuclear war break out." While President Reagan went further to stress that "a nuclear war will never end in victory, and it should never be fought." The starting points of both sides' nuclear strategies are being shifted to the avoidance and prevention of nuclear war.

Second, some changes have also taken place regarding the strategic thinking on how to give play to the role of nuclear deterrents, and how to avoid and prevent a nuclear war. Basically both sides pursued the so-called strategy of "assuring mutual destruction," with "stakes" on the cities and people of the other side. Now it is believed that such a deterrent role purely based on "terror" is waning; greater stress is focused on general multi-layer deterrents, namely to give play to the role of regular weapons deterrents on the basis of offensive

strategic weapons deterrents, while applying the means of disarmament and arms control to check the outbreak of nuclear war or another world war.

Third, it is impossible for either the United States or the Soviet Union to achieve military superiority by relying on the existing nuclear offensive system under the present conditions; moreover, their security coefficients have dropped by a large margin and the economic burden has gone quite beyond their means. Both countries are seeking new ways in vying for military superiority. President Reagan formally proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] project in March 1983, in an attempt to build a multi-layer anti-ballistic missile defense system with space-based kinetic energy weaponry as its backbone. Although Reagan asserted that the SDI project aims to select "outmoded" and "useless" nuclear weapons to realize the transition from "guaranteeing mutual destruction" to "guaranteeing mutual survival," in fact, it is an important step in seizing military superiority by building a new strategic weapon system which is as defensive as offensive. The Soviet Union started developing its strategic defensive system earlier than the United States, but has lagged behind in results and development. The abovementioned facts show that the two nations are undergoing the evolution from the pure offensive-type strategic weapons to a nuclear strategy serving both defensive and offensive purposes.

And fourth, corresponding to the abovementioned changes in strategic thinking, new characteristics in the development of U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces are on the horizon. Both sides are changing from pursuing the quantity of offensive strategic nuclear weapons to improving their existing nuclear offensive systems, namely high-precision hits, survival capability, and capability for breaking down defense, while readjusting the nuclear force structure to guarantee deterrent reliability.

Background of Readjustment

First, the readjustment of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategies is closely connected with their strategic readjustments since the beginning of the 1980s. Both sides have come to see that the old pattern is outdated under the present situation, and only by seeking new ways, especially by developing their comprehensive national strength, will it be possible for them to possess sufficient strength to contend with each other. This understanding has driven them each to reassess its own security interests and strategy, its nuclear strategy in particular, while making relative readjustments.

Second, the strategy of "assuring mutual destruction" has not eliminated the danger of nuclear war over the past few decades. With the ever increasing volume of nuclear weapons on both sides, people are very much worried about the prospects of a "nuclear doom's day." The theory of a "nuclear winter" first proposed in the

early 1980s has further pushed forward the upsurge of the world anti-nuclear movement, bringing increasingly strong political and moral pressure on the United States and the Soviet Union.

Third, the "hyper-saturation" of U.S. and Soviet nuclear strength and the rise of new technological revolution have promoted the readjustment of U.S. and Soviet strategies. On the one hand, the two sides possessed a total of some 50,000 nuclear warheads, reaching a point of "hyper-saturation;" a considerable part of which are to be discarded as rejects or to be renovated. On the other, the development of science and technology has provided the development of new weapons with opportunities, making the nuclear offensive system more varied and reliable and the conception of strategic defense feasible.

The change in nuclear strategies has made possible the pairing of the arms race with disarmament. The two sides conducted arms control in the past; basically, they aimed at an "escalating balance." In readjusting their nuclear strategies, both sides have thought of reducing surplus or outmoded weapons to cutback unnecessary and superfluous ones to develop new and highly

advanced weapons. Hence, the initialling of the accord on eliminating medium-range missiles. At the same time, the possibility is great for an accord on the cutback of 50 percent or more offensive nuclear strategic weapons.

The Talk of the "Post-Nuclear Era"

The readjustment of U.S. and Soviet nuclear strategies is the inevitable historical trend after decades of nuclear forces development. At present, many people in the world strategy research circles are talking about the issue of a "post-nuclear era." There are different views on the implications of a "post-nuclear era." To sum up, they fall into two categories: First, the existing nuclear deterrent system will transit to a new deterrent system with the combination of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons and eventually be replaced by a strategic system with non-nuclear weapons as the key link. Second, it is an era in which mankind will be wise and mature enough to totally eliminate nuclear weapons. However, neither case can be fulfilled within a short period. Therefore, in the 20th century at least, the nuclear deterrent systems of the United States and the Soviet Union a with nuclear offensive as the main aspect will be maintained.

INTRABLOC

'Strategic Balance' Assessment Analyzed

PM2707134288 Moscow APN MILITARY BULLETIN
in English No 12, Jun 88 pp 6-11

[Article by Doctor of Technical Sciences Vitaliy Tsygichko, expert at the USSR Academy of Sciences Research Institute of System Studies: "An Evaluation of the Strategic Balance in Europe"]

[Text] From the Editors

With the article by Doctor Vitaliy Tsygichko "What Balance Are We Discussing in Vienna?" (MILITARY BULLETIN, No 11, 1988) we begin a new series linked with the talks on cuts in conventional troops and weapons in Europe.

The fact that there was no objective estimate of the real alignment of forces between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO complicates the attainment of a compromise solution in this sphere.

In this situation we regard as constructive Vitaliy Tsygichko's proposal to compare the combat potential of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO forces by means of mathematical simulation of the processes of armed struggle. He believes that simulated models are used for assessing and choosing military and political targets and priorities, working out military strategy, formulating the tasks of their solution, adopting concepts for the development of the armed forces.

At present the theory and methods of mathematic simulation are in an advanced stage already. More and more books are being devoted to this subject and it is being discussed at international conferences.

However, a switchover of talks to this foundation would require solution of a whole number of scientific, theoretical, organizational and technical problems. Difficulties may arise during the adoption and use of a single model (or models) for assessing the alignment of forces between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO because each side is most likely to come up with its own version. Meanwhile, the adoption of a single model at the talks would help achieve equal security despite any differences in troops and weapons.

Vitaliy Tsygichko maintains that the sides should negotiate the following:

- figures pertaining to the strategic equilibrium between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO;
- a type of mathematical model and a level of generalization;
- assumptions and restrictions adopted in a model;
- basic information for simulation;

—methods of using a model in the process of talks;

—scenarios of a possible war in Europe, within the framework of which the sides will assess figures pertaining to the strategic equilibrium and some other questions.

Following is the second article on the subject. [editorial introduction ends]

To find objective quantitative marks of the strategic balance in Europe acceptable both for the Warsaw Pact and NATO and methods of their calculation, a clear definition of the term "strategic balance" or SB is needed. For their requirements to the mathematical models of hostilities and to the contents of the scenarios under which they are computed.

A possible starting point for defining the notion of SB is the postulate of "guaranteed security" of the sides on any foreseeable situation in Europe. "Guaranteed security" shall be understood as the ability of each side to counter the attempts by the other side to wage offensive operations in the worst conditions for the defending side like, say, in the case of a surprise attack by the hypothetical enemy. In that case SB implies a situation where each side cannot undertake offensive action because such an attempt would involve unacceptable losses in manpower and materiel. If this interpretation of SB is accepted by the sides, the problem will then boil down to the definition of an acceptable range in the alignment of the sides' forces, within which guaranteed security of each side is attainable.

A quantitative assessment of the alignment of the sides' forces ensuring guaranteed security can be made by the more recent armed conflicts. That experience is reflected both in combat manuals and in other war regulations. According to the contemporary views, the attacking side must have an at least 5:1 edge in the alignment of first-echelon forces in the direction of the main attack. The question is how to establish a general acceptable alignment of forces in Europe and the conditions which will prevent both sides from building the necessary edge for an attack in any direction of the European theatre, which means that SB will be maintained.

This is a difficult theoretical problem which can only be resolved by mathematical modelling of hostilities under different scenarios of a hypothetical war in Europe. The models must reflect in sufficient detail the time and space dynamics of the armed struggle. They must take into consideration the combat strength and the operational deployment of the sides' forces in potential operations, the troops' combat readiness by the start of the hostilities, troop mobility factors, combat effectiveness of weapons, ways and standard characteristics of their combat use, modes of troops' actions and interaction in hostilities, and effectiveness of intelligence and command.

If a model takes into proper account the said factors and conditions, it can help evaluate the actual capabilities or the potential of the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in waging offensive operations in different conditions of the beginning and of the course of war in Europe, and delineate the SB zone ensuring guaranteed security of the sides. The model will help make qualitative assessments of the sides' proposals and work out compromise decisions with clear understanding of their consequences.

If the sides come to terms on the model and initial data for modelling, a general pattern for locating the SB zone can be as follows. Each side construes the worst scenario of the beginning of war for itself and decides with the help of the model the correlation of the sides' potentials guaranteeing the impossibility of offensive operations by the other side. Thus we will get a margin in the correlation of the sides' potential where SB is guaranteed.

Next, each side figures out the actual potential of the other side under the same scenarios and the actual correlation of the potentials. If that correlation does not overreach the pre-modelled SB margin, then talks can centre on measures involving mutual troop reductions by the sides which naturally should not upset SB. If either side has an advantage, the task of the first stage of negotiations will be agreement on the attainment of SB: i.e., reduction of troops by the side which has the advantage or creation of conditions under which the said advantage disappears—for example, through the exclusion of conditions for a surprise attack.

In the latter case, the scenario must be reviewed and a new margin in the alignment of the potentials guaranteeing SB must be computed. In other words, the proposed approach helps evaluate the impact on SB of both the actual strength of the sides' troops and of the conditions of their potential employment and offers an opportunity for constructive talks on the terms of guaranteeing security (mutual verification, warning procedures, etc.). Mathematical models of hostilities have made it possible to explore some of the more general dependences of the magnitude of the SB zone on the absolute magnitude of the compared potentials and other factors and conditions of armed struggle. For example, with the absence of conditions for a surprise attack resulting from a reduction of the absolute potentials, the SB zone grows larger because the more troops, the more there are opportunities for their concentration in a particular direction, and the lower the threshold of guaranteed security (fig. 2). Besides, the higher the potentials of the sides, the heavier the impact on the results of probable hostilities of such factors as troop mobility, reconnaissance, the standard of command and so on.

To safeguard oneself against probable inaccuracies in the modelling of hostilities and in the programming of initial data and against other sources of errors, the sides may agree to narrow down the SB zone to a zone of guaranteed SB. It is within the framework of that latter zone that negotiations should be conducted.

One spinoff of the delineation of the guaranteed SB zone is the possibility to project simpler models for determining the relationship between the sides' potentials and for finding compromises at negotiations.

NATO's 'Peculiar Reaction' to Pact Proposals

*LD2707124088 Moscow TASS in English
1154 GMT 27 Jul 88*

[Text] Moscow July 27 TASS—By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev

There has been a peculiar reaction from the NATO headquarters to the latest initiatives of the Warsaw Treaty Organization on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

At first it was stated in Brussels that the proposal of the Warsaw Treaty countries does not meet NATO's fundamental demand for asymmetrical reduction of Soviet Armed Forces. Later, clearly under the pressure of the world public opinion, NATO officials described the proposals of the Warsaw Treaty countries as businesslike and encouraging. And finally, some NATO leaders came out with statements whose essence is that there have been no initiatives of Warsaw Treaty countries on conventional forces, that the West has made several obvious positive signals over the recent month, while the Warsaw Treaty Organization has given no response.

NATO's stand with regard to proposals of the Warsaw Treaty countries essentially remains negative so far. The North Atlantic bloc countries insisting above all on the reduction of tanks and artillery, and on unilateral reduction, to be made by the Warsaw Treaty countries only. NATO strategists would not consider elimination of asymmetry and imbalances in the areas of military might in which NATO has the obvious advantage in Europe—tactical aviation, combat helicopters, anti-tank systems, aircraft carriers.

The NATO headquarters in Brussels have not given an intelligible answer to the proposal of the Warsaw Treaty countries to exchange data on the military might of the two alliances before the opening of the talks, to verify these data thoroughly by means of on-site inspections. It is surmised that such an exchange of data can destroy NATO's myth about the "overwhelming military preponderance" of the Warsaw Treaty countries which was used by NATO officials for the stepping up of the arms race.

NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner declares that the North Atlantic alliance will be able to present its concept of disarmament in Europe only by the summer of next year.

NATO officials have been constantly using the argument about the "overwhelming preponderance" of the Warsaw Treaty countries in conventional forces in order to oppose progress at the talks on nuclear and space arms,

in order to prevent the creation of nuclear and chemical weapons free zones in Europe. Now that countries of the socialist community propose to embark above all on the levelling out of the military might of the two alliances for individual indexes, NATO strategists beat a retreat.

For what reason?

It is now talked in the West about confusion in the ranks of NATO in the face of a "new peace drive of the Warsaw Treaty countries", about the fact that the interest of separate members of the alliance do not coincide, about the impact of the coming presidential elections in the USA on the working out of the single stand of the alliance with regard to the proposals of the Warsaw Treaty countries.

But the point of the matter, apparently, is that the NATO leaders are not yet ready to give up their course at achieving military preponderance in Europe. The stereotypes of the prenuclear age are apparently too deeply ingrained in the minds of politicians and military from the North Atlantic bloc.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

U.S. INF Inspectors Initiate Procedures for Czechoslovakia

Will Check N. Moravia Bases

LD2007160288 Prague CTK in English
1456 GMT 20 Jul 88

[Text] Prague July 20 (CTK)—The United States asked today for permission to inspect a former missile base in Hranice, North Moravia, on the basis of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.

In tune with the agreement among Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and the German Democratic Republic on inspections and their implementation, Czechoslovakia voiced consent.

The group of ten inspectors will arrive in Czechoslovakia tomorrow.

Arrive in Prague 21 Jul

LD2107084288 Prague CTK in English
0737 GMT 21 Jul 88

[Text] Prague July 21 (CTK)—A group of ten U.S. inspectors arrived here today to verify compliance with commitments arising from the Soviet-U.S. Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty at a former missile base at Hranice, North Moravia.

The on-site inspection is carried out in tune with an agreement between Czechoslovakia, the USSR and the GDR, signed by the foreign ministers of these countries in Berlin on December 11, 1987.

A total of 39 Soviet operational tactical missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 kilometres including nuclear warheads and 24 mobile launchers were moved from Hranice in February and March this year, i.e., before the ratification of the INF Treaty, to the site of their liquidation in the USSR. These weapons were deployed in Czechoslovakia in response to the deployment of U.S. medium-range missiles and Pershing 2 missiles in Western Europe.

The former missile base at Hranice houses at present a Czechoslovak People's Army corps.

The U.S. inspectors will go to Hranice today and will immediately start inspecting activities. Under the adopted documents, the inspection can take 24 hours and can be extended by another eight hours.

U.S. INF Inspection Team To Inspect Hranice Missile Base

Inspectors 'Satisfied' With CSSR Visit

LD2107121788 Prague CTK in English
1146 GMT 21 Jul 88

[Text] Prague July 21 (CTK)—After arriving at Prague's Ruzyně Airport earlier today, the U.S. inspectors agreed with Soviet officers accompanying them on a precise program of inspection activities.

In harmony with adopted documents the Soviet side then controlled inspection apparatuses. Asked by CTK about the result, Colonel Ivan Abrosimov said that all aids corresponded to the provisions of the INF Treaty.

After talks with Soviet officials and representatives of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, the Defence Ministry and other bodies, the inspectors accompanied by Soviet and Czechoslovak officials left for the site of the former missile base at Hranice, North Moravia. Head of the group of U.S. inspectors Colonel Laurence G. Kelly told CTK before leaving that the U.S. side was satisfied with all conditions created by the Soviet partners and the Czechoslovak side.

He further said that the group had been told by the Soviet side that there are no objects subject to the provisions of the treaty at Hranice. He added that whenever they received such a notice from the Soviet side they saw for themselves that it was true. He said he expected that no such objects are at Hranice but the inspection has to be carried out so that both respected. This step can only strengthen mutual confidence and understanding, Colonel Kelly said.

TV Reports Arrival in Prague
*LD2107203088 Prague Television Service in Czech
1730 GMT 21 Jul 88*

[Text] As reported in yesterday's television newsreel, the United States has asked for an inspection of the former Soviet missile base at Hranice. In accordance with the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, Ruzyně airport in Prague is the point of entry for the group of experts in our territory.

[Unidentified reporter] [Words indistinct] Hercules of the U.S. Armed Forces is bringing a 10-member group of U.S. inspectors which will carry out the first inspection on the territory of Czechoslovakia. First to leave the aircraft is the leader of the group. He greets the representatives of the Czechoslovak People's Army and representatives of the Soviet Army and the Soviet Embassy in Czechoslovakia. Then he invites the other members of the inspection group to leave the aircraft and introduces them individually to the Czechoslovak and Soviet hosts.

[Unidentified interviewer] What will you be inspecting in Czechoslovakia?

[Unidentified speaker in English with superimposed Czech translation] We are coming to carry out a basic inspection of the Soviet missile base on Czechoslovak territory. We are coming to verify whether or not certain pieces of the equipment, liable to the treaty, remain deployed at this base.

[Interviewer] When will the inspection start? Will it be today?

[Speaker] In accordance with the treaty, the inspection will start within 4 hours of our arrival by air, that is, later today.

[Reporter] And here we are with the U.S. inspectors and their Czechoslovak and Soviet entourage in the barracks at Hranice in Moravia where Soviet operational tactical missiles were previously based. The U.S. inspectors were first briefed in detail on the original deployment of the Soviet missiles in their ready positions, then in the barracks, in the stores, and in the entire area of the previous deployment they verified for themselves that the units and the weapons have been removed. A total of 39 Soviet SS-12 operational tactical missiles, together with their 24 mobile launch pads, had been deployed at Hranice since 1983. It was the only base of Soviet nuclear missiles on Czechoslovak territory, liable to the stipulations of the 8 December 1987 Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. As is known, the USSR did away with this base by mid-March, that is, prior to the ratification of the above-mentioned treaty, as a unilateral act of good will. According to the stipulations of the Soviet-U.S. treaty, the U.S. inspectors were verifying this directly.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

U.S. INF Inspectors Conclude Work in the GDR
*LD2007143588 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1358 GMT 20 Jul 88*

[Text] Berlin, 20 Jul (ADN)—The U.S. INF inspectors currently in the GDR completed their activities today. At the Leipzig-Schelditz Airport they were seen off by representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from the Ministry of National Defense, and from the Moscow Center for the Reduction of Nuclear Risk in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Between 18-20 July 1988, two inspection groups inspected former bases in the GDR on the basis of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. During their inspections they visited the former bases at Waren, Wokul, Bischofswerda, and Koenigsbrueck, where SS-22 [as received] missiles had been stationed up to 25 February 1988.

Party, State Bodies Ratify Pact Session Results
*LD2107182788 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1600 GMT 21 Jul 88*

[Text] Berlin, 21 Jul (ADN)—The GDR has helped the gradual strengthening of the positive tendencies in international relations with great initiative and with its predictable and constructive policy of dialogue and cooperation. This was stressed in a joint declaration of the SED Central Committee Politburo, the GDR Council of State, and the Council of Ministers on the results of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee conference held in Warsaw 15-16 July. In the future, too, the GDR will contribute with all its strength to the further improvement of international relations with the objective of making the path toward improvement irreversible, it is stated. At the same time, it cannot be overlooked that the opponents of any kind of disarmament are reinforcing their activities.

The document goes on to state that the Warsaw Pact countries are now directing themselves without delay toward further steps for the radical reduction of military potential while maintaining equality and equal security. This concerns the 50-percent reduction in the USSR's and the United States' strategic offensive weapons with strict observance of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, a reduction in the number and eventual halting of nuclear weapon tests, the complete banning and destruction of chemical weapons, and the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The Politburo, the State Council, and the Council of Ministers especially welcomed the conception on conventional disarmament in Europe, produced by the Warsaw Pact states, as a constructive step toward the

preparation of future negotiations. They expressed their expectation that the NATO states will react positively to it, the declaration continues.

The allied socialist states forcefully called for the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons in the disarmament process in Europe. A quick solution to this problem would contribute to increasing security on the continent, and considerably strengthen mutual trust in the "European house."

The declaration states that the meeting emphasized with satisfaction the increasing significance of the proposals on disarmament and strengthening peace on a regional basis. The GDR will continue with resolution and consistency the initiatives on the creation of a nuclear weapons-free corridor, a chemical weapons-free zone, and a zone of trust and security in central Europe. It is also urgently necessary to create a comprehensive system for ecological security. All European states could work out internationally binding norms and principles for this before 1992.

The GDR will help with all its strength to realize the declared steps on improving cooperation between fraternal states taken at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee.

U.S. INF Inspectors Arrive

LD2207090888 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0733 GMT 22 Jul 88

[Text] Berlin, 22 Jul (ADN)—A U.S. inspection group arrived in the GDR today. It was received at Leipzig-Schkeuditz Airport by representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of National Defense, and of the Moscow Center for the Reduction of Nuclear Risks.

This is the second visit by U.S. inspectors to check the implementation on GDR territory of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. From 18-20 July 1988, two groups

inspected the former Soviet missile sites at Waren, Wokuhl, Bischofswerda, and Koenigsbrueck, at which SS-22 missiles were stationed until 25 February 1988.

In accordance with the GDR-USSR-CSSR agreement on inspections in connection with the INF Treaty, the GDR will again support the U.S. inspectors in their work.

HUNGARY

Premier Grosz Comments on Withdrawal of Soviet Troops

LD2107074488 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0600 GMT 21 Jul 88

[Text] Hungary hopes that all troops stationed abroad will be withdrawn before 1995. However, there is no question of the Soviet soldiers in Hungary being withdrawn unilaterally and unconditionally. This was said by Karoly Grosz in Chicago at a gala dinner hosted in his honor by leading businessmen.

The Hungarian party general secretary and premier recalled that the Soviet foreign minister has proposed that all troops stationed abroad should be withdrawn by 1995. We Hungarians hope that this will be fulfilled before the time limit, said Karoly Grosz. He added that inasmuch as conventional armed forces are reduced worldwide, then as a first step the program would be implemented in the so-called buffer [uetkoezoe] zones, for example in Hungary.

Speaking about our internal policy, the party general secretary said that after 40 years of conditioning, it is not easy to realize a program corresponding to today's demands. We must finish with the ideology which has been overtaken by life. However, we must preserve what is still of value today.

Karoly Grosz expressed his hope that the rapprochement of the two superpowers would provide an opportunity for the small countries to develop their own aspect.

The party general secretary and premier traveled to the state of California from Chicago. He will hold talks in San Francisco and Los Angeles.

U.S. Inspectors Complete Mission in GDR
LD2007183688 Moscow TASS in English
1727 GMT 20 Jul 88

[Text] Berlin July 20 TASS—The U.S. military inspectors, who stayed in the GDR, have completed their mission today. As the ADN news agency reported, from 18 through 20 July, based on the Soviet-American INF Treaty, the inspectors carried out verification in places in the GDR, where missiles had previously been in position. The U.S. experts inspected facilities in Wahren, Wokul, Bischofswerda and Konigsbruck, where the OTR-22 missiles stood up to February 25.

INF Treaty Verification Process Continues

Historic Nature Viewed
PM2507151788 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
22 Jul 88 Second Edition p 7

[Own political observer Gennadiy Vasilyev "Viewpoint" article: "Yesterday It Seemed Inconceivable"]

[Text] People have called the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles the first step toward a nuclear-free world. The word "first" includes a recognition of the unique nature of this international agreement. Never before have the two great powers come to a voluntary agreement to eliminate two entire classes of arms—and nuclear arms at that! But it is not just the fact that the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles was concluded that is extraordinary, but also many other things linked with its elaboration and implementation. Including measures to monitor its fulfillment.

"A team of 70 Soviet inspectors has arrived at the Travis AFB near San Francisco. In accordance with the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles they will start on-site inspection with a view to monitoring fulfillment of its provisions... Soon after this meeting the 22 inspectors left the Travis base for Magna, Utah, to visit the secret plant producing components for Pershing-2 missiles." This is an extract from a TASS correspondent report. Here is what ABC television said the same day on its news programs: "Twenty teams of U.S. inspectors arrived in the Soviet Union Friday evening to observe and monitor the INF treaty. They will monitor missile bases in East Europe."

The outward ordinariness of these reports conceals the start of activity never before seen in history. Activity to prepare for the implementation of the first step toward a nuclear-free world. How will all this be done in practice? In the space of 3 years the two countries will have to destroy a total of more than 2,500 intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (approximately 4 percent of nuclear arsenals). The destruction will be carried out in different ways: by detonating, burning, or by launching (for an agreed number of intermediate-range missiles). The nose section casing will be crushed under pressure

and the nuclear warhead will be assigned for reuse [yadernyy zaryad peredayetsya na utilizatsiyu]. Launchers and auxiliary equipment will be eliminated by rendering them unusable as combat hardware. And it is permitted to use former mobile launchers and transporters (truck tractors) in the national economy.

The verification measures envisaged by the treaty are unprecedented. For the first time it is planned to conduct on-site inspections with representatives of the other side visiting military bases, dumps, and plants that relate to the arms in question. Inspection will be carried out both on Soviet and U.S. territory and on the territory of other countries where these missiles are located—the GDR and the CSSR on the one hand, and the FRG, Britain, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands on the other. It will cover a 13-year period—the 3 years during which the missiles are to be destroyed and the 10 years following.

The inspection teams whose arrival was reported by the mass media will carry out the initial work—making an inventory, as it were, of what is to be eliminated. Subsequently, inspectors will observe the actual process of missile elimination and visit the bases listed. There will be permanent inspection at two sites. In the Soviet Union this will be the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in the Udmurt ASSR, and in the United States it will be the Hercules Plant No 1 at Magna, Utah.

Allowing foreign specialists and qualified "spies" [soglyadatay] into military bases and military plants to inspect everything coming in and out? Just 2 or 3 years ago nobody would have believed it possible. Today it is reality. The two countries accepted it voluntarily, realizing that this "revelation of military secrets" accords with their interests. Because without the most stringent verification there can be no disarmament. Because adequate information about each other's armed forces, introducing an element of predictability, becomes a factor of stability in our dangerous nuclear missile era.

Of course, the world in which we now live still bears the imprint of the old world in many respects. The confrontation between the two military-political alliances remains a reality. As does the fact that the colossal means of destruction accumulated by the countries threaten to destroy mankind. But the shoots of a new world setup are pushing up like grass through asphalt. They are the shoots of a future where the peoples' interests will be served not by secrecy but by glasnost, not by superiority in arms but by parity at the lowest possible level, and not by gambles on force but by the complete elimination of all means of mass destruction.

U.S. Official Interviewed
PM2507145988 Moscow TRUD in Russian
22 Jul 88 p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Wagovich, "representative of the U.S. Defense Department On-Site Inspection Agency," conducted by own correspondent V. Sisnev under "We Report the Details" rubric: "An American Military Man's Opinion: Conditions Are Being Fully Met"]

[Text] Washington, 21 Jul—Soviet military specialists

have already visited the United States twice, carrying out snap [vnezapnyy] inspections at four missile bases in conformity with the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. How is inspection carried out in practice, and what are the conditions that must be observed by the receiving side, in this instance the Americans? I asked Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Wagovich, representative of the U.S. Defense Department's specially created On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), to answer these and other questions of interest to TRUD readers. He has personally been a member of American escort teams, so his information is first hand, so to speak.

Wagovich: The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles stipulates that each side must notify its intention to carry out an inspection at least 16 hours before the arrival of its inspectors on the other country's territory. The information is conveyed via nuclear-risk reduction centers set up in both countries. In the United States one of two points of arrival is possible—Washington or San Francisco. On arrival on American soil the Soviet inspectors had to name the locations they wished to visit within 48 hours. All these locations are laid down in the treaty. We have 10 of them, but some contain two missile bases, giving a total of 17. After notification we have 9 hours (no more!) to convey the Soviet team to its destination. On site 1 hour is given over to so-called preinspection information: The visitors are supplied with requisite data on what they are to see and also certain information to ensure their personal safety.

Sisnev: For example?

Wagovich: For example, certain of our bases are sited in localities where dangerous poisonous snakes are not uncommon. That, of course, is just one example. Inspection proper lasts 24 hours. If for some reason this period is insufficient, it can with our agreement be extended a further 8 hours. This need has not arisen so far. Four hours are then allocated for writing a report on the results of the inspection [obsledovaniye], which basically consists of listing the military equipment present. The team leader also enters comments that he deems necessary and briefs the accompanying American group on the findings. We enter what we deem necessary—whether we agree with the conclusions or not—in the same form. Two copies are made, both of which are signed by the team leaders. The Soviet inspectors must then be returned to Washington or San Francisco in the shortest time possible, from where they set off home within the next 24 hours. But they are entitled to express a desire to carry out another inspection in another locality. And then we are again obliged to carry this out within a maximum of 9 hours.

Sisnev: Have any conflict situations arisen during the last two inspections?

Wagovich: I am not authorized to answer that kind of question.

Sisnev: Then I will rephrase my question. Have you been satisfied with the way inspection has been carried out?

Wagovich: I can only express my personal opinion, but I think that it reflects the general feeling. We can be satisfied with both the way our cooperation has begun and the way both sides are demonstrating readiness to cooperate to achieve the best results. I am also thinking of the inspections carried out by our teams in the Soviet Union.

Sisnev: Under the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles a permanent center of residence for Soviet inspectors is being set up in the city of Magna, Utah. What is it, and why was that locality chosen?

Wagovich: It involves observing an enterprise producing missile equipment in each of our countries. A permanent team of up to 30 inspectors will in this case be based in the vicinity of Plant No 1 producing Hercules aircraft (C-130 military transport planes—editor). It previously produced motors for Pershings, so the inspectors will with the aid of appropriate equipment be able to observe what kind of freight is delivered to and leaves the plant and whether any violations of the treaty are taking place there. A permanent team of 22 people arrived at the same time as the first Soviet inspection team on 2 July and is now in Magna—albeit, it is true, in a temporary headquarters. But in 6 months' time it will receive a permanent residence.

Sisnev: The Soviet Union has notified the United States that the destruction of intended missiles will begin at five locations on 1 August. The U.S. side, however, has not so far set any timetable. What is the reason for this?

Wagovich: We have indeed not yet given a precise date, but I think that it will be done very soon. I do not know exactly what has caused the delay but, as far as I am aware, while all the locations for missile destruction have not yet been determined, the process is under way now.

Sisnev: As a professional military man, what do you think of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles?

Wagovich: I am very optimistic. Judging by the way the first inspections have proceeded, the treaty can and must be carried out. This is a unique phenomenon in itself; it is the first time our countries have achieved such a degree of mutual understanding. We have never carried out such inspections before, but I am certain that they will be carried out successfully and to our mutual satisfaction.

U.S. To Inspect CSSR Missile Base
PM2507145388 Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian
22 Jul 88 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "U.S. Inspection in CSSR"]

[Text] Prague, 21 Jul—The United States yesterday expressed a desire to inspect the former Soviet missile base in the CSSR in the region of the population center of Hranice on the basis of the USSR-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.

CTK reported that the CSSR—in accordance with the inspections agreement between the CSSR, the USSR, and the GDR—had consented to the inspection. A group comprising 10 American inspectors will arrive in the CSSR on 21 July.

Soviet Inspectors' Arrival in UK Reported
PM2207120388 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
22 Jul 88 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by unnamed own correspondent: "Aeroflot Aircraft at Greenham Common Base"]

[Text] London—The Il-62 with the Aeroflot identification mark landed on the concrete runway of the Greenham Common air base.

It was delivering unusual visitors to the base, on which there are 96 U.S. cruise missiles. They are the Soviet inspectors who, under the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, have the right to visit such bases on a reciprocal basis.

V. Lebedev, who heads the group, made a statement on his arrival stressing that an unprecedented period has arrived in human history. Our expert also pointed to the fact that the elimination of two types of nuclear missiles is the best method for making life safer and happier inasmuch as war and happiness are incompatible.

The Soviet guests are living directly on the Greenham Common base. They go to the canteen serving the U.S. personnel. The selection of video cassettes which their hosts offered them for viewing in their spare time includes the Hollywood movie "Star Wars." Having divided into two groups—one studied the state of affairs at Greenham Common, the other at Molesworth—the Soviet inspectors set to work.

I asked Mrs Linda Chernesayd [name as published], who is a member of the leadership of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament—the most mass-based and influential antiwar organization in the British Isles—to comment on this visit. She will leave for Moscow in a few days: She has been invited by the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace to attend as an observer an operation to destroy our first intermediate-range missile.

Here is what she said:

"I am very pleased that the inspectors from the USSR have been able to come to the Greenham Common and Molesworth bases. The provisions of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles have thus begun to be implemented. Understandably, these are the first steps on the path to freeing the world of nuclear weapons. The Soviet-U.S. agreement on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles signified a breakthrough at the nuclear arms control talks.

"I await with interest my trip to the USSR next week. I will witness the destruction of the first SS-20 type Soviet missile. As someone who has been a member of the campaign for nuclear disarmament for many years, seeking a ban on weapons of mass annihilation, I feel pleased and surprised that I have been given the opportunity to attend an act symbolizing the beginning of the end of nuclear weapons."

Inspectors Complete Tour
LD2107195188 Moscow *TASS* in English
1935 GMT 21 Jul 88

[Text] London July 21, TASS—Soviet inspectors visiting here in keeping with the verification provisions of the Soviet-American INF Treaty have completed their on-site tours of the Greenham Common and Molesworth bases where a total of 119 U.S. cruise missiles are located that are to be scrapped under the treaty.

The inspectors divided into two groups, each including ten members, Wednesday and these went each to its particular base.

Their aim was to verify the declared number of missiles, launchers and other equipment which will later be eliminated.

In accordance with the verification provisions, the inspectors may not make any comments to the press on the results of their work. The leader of the combined Soviet group, V.S. Lebedev, said in a brief statement two days ago during the official welcome for Soviet specialists at Greenham Common that the experience of the first inspectors has shown that the United States and the Soviet Union are strictly abiding by the treaty and the first steps to realize it have been successful.

The Soviet inspectors fly to Moscow tomorrow.

U.S. Inspectors Arrive in USSR

See SS-20 Missile Destroyed
LD2207205588 Moscow *TASS International Service* in Russian 2009 GMT 22 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow, 22 Jul (TASS)—The first explosion of an RSD-10 (SS-20) missile was conducted at the test site of Kapustin Yar (Volgograd Oblast) in the presence of a

group of U.S. inspectors at 0905 Moscow time today, Colonel Gennadiy Komogorov, chief of the Internal Inspection Department of the National Center for Control of the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Missiles, stated today.

In accordance with the INF Treaty, the group of U.S. inspectors, led by Commander John Williams, spent 3 days verifying [proverit] the initial data which were given to the U.S. side after the ratification of the treaty—in particular, the number of RSD-10 (SS-20) missiles concentrated and prepared for elimination at the Kapustin Yar test site.

"I felt that I was one of the first to take part in such a great thing," John Williams stated to journalists at "Sheremetyevo-1" Airport, one of the inspectors' two points of entry onto the territory of the USSR. "The process of elimination proceeded in accordance with the treaty. When I saw the result of the destruction of the missile, I had a feeling of satisfaction."

He noted that throughout the whole inspection, he had felt the deep responsibility of both the Soviet and the U.S. sides. Not only was the number of weapons declared by the Soviet side verified during the inspection but the technical data corresponding to the signed documents as well. It was revealed that they completely matched the numerical indicators which had been cited by the Soviet side, John Williams said.

Depart for West Germany

LD2307072688 Moscow TASS in English
0710 GMT 23 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow July 23 TASS—Commander John Williams expressed satisfaction with the inspection trip to the USSR. He headed a group of U.S. military experts who carried out an inspection at Kapustin Yar test site not far from Volgograd where RSD-10 missiles, which are known in the West as SS-20, will be eliminated by demolition under the INF Treaty.

Mr Williams told journalists before leaving Moscow by air that throughout the three days of the inspection he felt profound responsibility of both the Soviet and American sides. Full identity of the number of systems and their technical data declared by the Soviet side was confirmed during the inspection.

To John Williams that was already the fourth inspection trip to the USSR.

I can point out that wherever we went, we met with an exceptionally high degree of organisation and of the efficiency of the carrying out of inspections. We were received as hospitably as one could only dream of. All the meetings were notable for high professionalism, attentiveness and considerate attitude. Full mutual understanding was achieved and I hope that this is how it will be in future as well, he said.

The U.S. inspectors left Moscow for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) Friday night.

FRG's Bahr Hails Latest Warsaw Pact Proposals

PM2207111588 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 22 Jul 88 Second Edition p 5

[Interview with FRG's Egon Bahr in Bonn by NVOVSTI correspondent V. Sokolov for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA: "A Europe of Trust. Interview With the Well-Known West German Figure Egon Bahr"; date of interview not given]

[Text] Bonn—[Sokolov] Recently the Social Democratic Party of Germany, which you represent, and the SED (GDR), which was represented by Comrade Axen, put forward a proposal to create a European zone of trust. What can you say about the prehistory of this issue?

[Bahr] We opened our talks last year with the single purpose of transforming the nuclear-free corridor proposed a long time back by Olof Palme into a region, rather than just a corridor from which heavy conventional armor would also be removed. The talks revealed that work on this kind of project is a very complex matter. It must, without fail, be brought in line with the overall concept of stability in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals which has been proposed by the Warsaw Pact countries. We have decided to continue our talks on this subject in the fall, and this will be done. At the same time, we have come to the conclusion that, meanwhile, the question of confidence-building measures—that is, all that has been achieved in Stockholm—could, in the interests of security, be developed further. This provided the impetus for us to put forward, jointly with the SED, the proposal to create a zone of trust in Europe.

This will no longer be just a corridor. The zone of trust goes beyond the framework of a corridor and would apply to the whole of Europe. Confidence-building measures are possible only if applied to the whole of Europe. This is in keeping with Stockholm and with our additional proposals. The new elements of our proposals consist in the fact that the confidence-building measures make provision for the establishment, without fail, of a fundamentally new mechanism for the exchange of information on all military questions between East and West. This permanently operating mechanism will make it possible for the first time for European governments to try to ensure that an incorrect interpretation of information or false information cannot serve as a cause of a crisis. And it makes it possible to swiftly eliminate such a crisis should it, nonetheless, arise. Every government will be constantly aware of what is happening in Europe regarding military potentials and their deployment, right up to and including the creation of a satellite information system.

[Sokolov] What will the implementation of this idea depend on?

[Bahr] The main problem is whether the FRG Federal Government will accept this initiative. I have briefed the government on our proposals, and now that the coalition has learned about the Political Consultative Committee proposals put forward in Warsaw, it is aware that these are fundamental ideas also as far as the Warsaw Pact states are concerned.

[Sokolov] You have just mentioned the community of your ideas and the latest initiatives of the Warsaw Pact countries. How do you assess what has been proposed in Warsaw in this context?

[Bahr] It is necessary to recall that Mikhail Gorbachev set this process in motion on 15 January 1986 when he put forward the initiative to create a nuclear-free world. This made some people smile, but only until both leaders declared it the main aim of their policies in Geneva. We welcomed these proposals in January 1986, although we did note the absence of a solution to the question of conventional arms. For Europe this question is just as important as nuclear arms reduction. The Soviet Union acknowledged our criticism and as early as April 1986 started talking about this question. In May-June, the well-known Budapest agreement was concluded which, as a practical aim of ensuring stability in Europe, proposed that conventional arms also be reduced.

NATO reacted to this with the following phrase: We will consider these proposals. A special group was set up which has been considering these proposals for 2 years now. Each member of this group, that is to say, each state has been assigned specific tasks. At first, it was promised that a decision would be adopted by December, but it did not materialize either in December or in spring 1987, or during the fall session of NATO, and it is still outstanding now in the summer of 1988.

It must be stated bluntly that NATO has been dragging out the solution of this question for 2 years and has failed to give a political answer to the Warsaw Pact countries' proposals. I believe that it is no exaggeration to say that the West was not ready for a reduction of conventional arms, that in general, it did not even take the possibility of such reductions into consideration despite the fact, as you know, that the Warsaw Pact countries had submitted similar proposals earlier.

The principled stance of the Warsaw Pact countries remains unaltered. However, the new option contains substantial new elements and great potential. What has been proposed in Warsaw could be described as a finished draft which makes it possible to sit down at the negotiating table right now, without delay. The Warsaw Pact countries have split their draft into three stages and taken account of all the NATO's wishes. They have declared their readiness to eliminate the existing superiority in conventional arms during the first stage. That

means that the elimination will, of course, be asymmetrical. This asymmetrical elimination of superiority applies also to the Western side, as the aim is to achieve a mutual equilibrium.

The provision on mutual exchanges of information on military potentials is of great importance because it constitutes a specific topic for negotiations. It is well known that the Warsaw Pact countries have proposed that data be exchanged even prior to the definition of the Vienna talks mandate. It is also characteristic that the Warsaw Pact countries' proposals envisage the implementation of confidence-building measures, which is precisely what our party and the SED have proposed. The Warsaw Pact countries' proposal to eliminate asymmetries during the first stage does not merely provide for moving troops and hardware from one place to another. It is envisaged demobilizing the forces, and at the same time, dismantling the hardware under international verification [kontrol]. This is a new and very interesting proposal. There is nothing to consider and weigh up here; after all, what is being proposed is a step toward actual and real disarmament.

The documents which we have adopted and signed together with the SED mention that our proposals coincide with the Warsaw Pact countries' proposals. They make provision for monitoring [kontrol] all strategic points: railroads, airfields, and so forth. I can see no point or wish expressed earlier by the West which has not been met by the Warsaw Pact countries.

Correction to Karpov on Dismantling Radar

[Text] Moscow TASS in English at 1404 GMT on 22 July transmits the following correction to the item headlined "Karpov on Dismantling of Krasnoyarsk Radar," published in the 20 July Soviet Union DAILY REPORT on page 2:

Column one, paragraph seven, line three reads: "...ready to dismantle the equipment of the Krasnoyarsk radar in..." (supplying "the equipment of")

Western View of Pact Proposals Noted PM2607100988 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jul 88 Second Edition p 4

[Article by political observer Gennadiy Vasilyev: "On European Salient; Socialist Countries' New Initiatives Are the Focus of Attention"]

[Excerpts] Hundreds of statements, articles, and commentaries contain comments from political leaders, public figures, and newspapers on the results of the conference of the Warsaw Pact states' Political Consultative Committee. In formulating briefly the thrust of the Political Consultative Committee's decisions, I would

say that they open up the possibility for a new breakthrough in the movement toward a secure, nonviolent world. This time in the sphere of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

It is hard to overestimate the importance of this step forward. Europe is a part of our planet where the two military-political blocs directly confront each other. Millions of servicemen, tens of thousands of tanks and aircraft, and enormous arsenals of ammunition are concentrated here. And although we call these weapons conventional, in terms of their lethal force under the conditions of our continent they differ little from nuclear weapons.

The entry into force of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles was the first step toward a nuclear-free world. It showed that disarmament is possible, that it is an entirely realistic task. But at the same time it raised the question: what next? Some NATO people, the most inert and bellicose among them, have launched dangerous activity in an attempt to delay and complicate the disarmament process. They are obsessed with the idea of "compensation" for the intermediate- and shorter-range missiles which are being eliminated and are calling for the modernization of other armaments not covered by the treaty. The argument that the Warsaw Pact countries have "overwhelming superiority in conventional forces" is being put into play again. In actual fact there are imbalances and asymmetries in the armed forces of the two military-political alliances. In some forms, in tanks, for instance, the advantage is on the side of the Warsaw Pact Organization, while in others, aircraft for instance, NATO has precedence. The correlation of the two alliances' forces is also uneven when broken down into regions.

In general it must be said that the assertion of the superiority of Soviet Armed Forces in Europe has for many years served as a kind of barrier which is used to cut off the process of disarmament, including a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear arms. This obstacle, if the West's reply is constructive, would now be removed. The imbalances and asymmetries would be eliminated and the forces of the two alliances would acquire a strictly defensive nature. The effective system of control envisaged in the proposals will also eliminate another question—the possibility of the concealment of facts, of deception.

The socialist countries showed again that they are not seeking one-sided advantages and are prepared to advance in the disarmament process on all salients in such a way that balance and parity are maintained at each stage. It is now up to the West to speak. Whether mankind succeeds in accomplishing a new bound toward a world built on reason depends on the West's readiness to display a constructive approach.

As a whole, optimistic notes prevail in the foreign reaction to the Political Consultative Committee's new initiatives. It is admitted that the socialist countries have displayed farsightedness, boldness, and flexibility, that they are ready to go half way to meet their Western partners' wishes, to seek constructive denouements for existing problems. The participants in the session of EEC ministers' council held in Athens assessed these initiatives positively. "The positions of East and West on disarmament issues look as though they are beginning to come closer," Belgian Foreign Relations Minister L. Tindemans sums up. "The Warsaw Pact's position on the question of the asymmetric reduction of armaments and on-site verification of the disarmament process was greeted very positively by the foreign ministers of the 12 EEC countries."

The decisions of the Warsaw conference were well received among leading circles in Bonn and Paris. During French Prime Minister M. Rocard's visit to the FRG, he and Chancellor H. Kohl spoke with approval of the Warsaw Pact's proposals and expressed themselves in favor of their careful study by the NATO allies. The West German Social Democrats go even further. E. Bahr, the Social Democratic Party of Germany's expert on questions of disarmament, advocated holding a special meeting of the NATO countries' leaders for a detailed discussion of the Political Consultative Committee's initiatives. In Bahr's opinion they offer the West broad scope for steps in response.

These and other positive assessments by Western politicians give rise to the hope for a countermovement, hope that the socialist countries' proposals will be successfully implemented. But we cannot fail also to note other voices, another reaction. The NATO leadership has been failing to express itself on the thrust of the matter for a suspiciously long time, citing the fact that it is still studying the Warsaw documents. London is silent. Washington is pretending that nothing has happened. It is being said that the Americans are too busy right now with their election affairs to notice "anything far from their own shores." But the United States does after all consider itself the NATO leader and much depends on Washington's position.

A certain confusion can be sensed in the NATO countries' conduct in the face of the socialist countries' proposals. How many years they have spent trumpeting about the "menacing superiority" of Soviet Armed Forces in Europe and intimidating the public with the danger of a "Soviet tank invasion." And suddenly these "reliable arguments" are losing their strength. Logic suggests that we must sit at the conference table and do real politics. But some people are obviously not ready for this. The habit of thinking in terms of "strength" and gaining points by propaganda maneuvers is having an effect.

The most thoughtful observers believe that the West is lagging behind in assimilating the ideas of the new political thinking, that it needs its own restructuring. The

British newspaper THE GUARDIAN writes about this in particular: "In the period 1979 through 1984 NATO and the Warsaw Pact did not cede their place to each other not only in terms of weapons but also in terms of lack of political flexibility." Then, THE GUARDIAN notes, the Soviet Union undertook a reassessment of its foreign policy reflecting the realities of the present-day world. "So far no similar self criticism is to be noted among NATO ruling circles," the newspaper concludes.

The fraternal countries' proposals on a substantial reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe are distinguished by realism and embody the desire to seek a mutually advantageous solution to the most complex international problems. Reflecting the renewal taking place in the socialist states, they open up prospects for building an all-European house in which relations between peoples would be based on equal security, trust, and good-neighborliness.

Soviet INF Inspector Describes U.S. Visit
PM2907140288 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 30, 24 Jul 88 p 7

[Eduard Khamidulin report on interview with Colonel Aleksandr Kuznetsov: "Inspector. A New Job Created by the Soviet-American INF Treaty"; date and place not given]

[Text] Col. Aleksandr Kuznetsov, 44, is one of the 400 Soviet experts who will be inspecting US missile installations—on a temporary or permanent basis—in accordance with the 1987 Soviet-US INF Treaty. Kuznetsov is a professional missileman. He graduated from the Serpuhov Higher Military Command Engineering School in 1968. For the last 20 years, not counting three years at Moscow's Military Academy, Kuznetsov has served in units equipped with ground-launched medium-range missiles. In March 1988 he was transferred to the Nuclear Risk-Reduction National Centre of the USSR (NC). The centre was set up after the treaty was signed in December 1987 during M. Gorbachev's visit to Washington.

Five Soviet inspection teams recently journeyed to the United States to check military facilities near San Francisco. Kuznetsov was one of the inspectors. We spoke to the colonel on his return.

The San Francisco detail was Kuznetsov's first trip abroad—let alone on such a responsible mission. Back in Moscow, he said he felt well though the flight had been exhausting. The flight on a special inspection jet from Moscow to San Francisco—with a stopover in Khabarovsk—took nearly 17 hours. Kuznetsov and his colleagues left Sheremetyevo Airport at noon Moscow time July 1 and landed on Travis Air Force Base, roughly 50 miles from San Francisco, at 7 p.m. local time the same

day. The Americans gave them a grand welcome. A group from the American NC was waiting near the gangway—along with reporters, photographers and film crews.

Pre-Inspection

After the welcome, the Soviet inspectors were taken to a hall where their personal belongings and containers with verification equipment underwent a strict customs examination. Containers were opened and the contents photographed. Then all the containers were closed, sealed and stored in a special room pending the inspection.

(Customs examinations are stipulated by the treaty. In Moscow, US equipment containers were also checked, personal belongings were not).

Customs at Travis took about three hours. Then the inspectors were taken in buses to the township. They were accommodated in two two-storey houses, something like a hotel with suites for four: an anteroom with soft furniture and colour TV, two bedrooms with two beds in each, a kitchen, and a shared bath. Both houses were fenced in with orange poles and orange ropes tied to them. The barrier was patrolled at all hours. One could not leave the grounds without a chaperone—even to go to the township. "This is in the interests of your security," the Americans explained.

(According to the Soviet NC, US inspection groups are usually accommodated at the Hotel Ukraina, not far from the city centre. In their spare time they may go anywhere they liked unchaperoned. There is no "orange rope".)

On July 1 the American side was notified of the intention to conduct an inspection and of the time of arrival at the point of entry. Later the Soviet inspectors delivered a communication indicating the inspection site to the point of entry. This is done to give the side being inspected time to get ready—exactly which facility will be verified is not stated.

On July 2 at 11 p.m. local time, three Soviet inspection groups notified the Americans as to which site they had selected for verification. The rule of the treaty went into force: within nine hours the inspected side must take the inspection groups to the places of verification. This was fulfilled.

Verification

A. Kuznetsov and his group verified the training site at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona. They arrived the morning of July 3. Pre-verification procedures took about an hour. The Americans told the Soviets about the facility, its distinctions and security, and then handed over all the documents necessary for verification.

When asked about the nature of his work as an inspector, Kuznetsov was more reticent: "The treaty forbids one to disclose information obtained in the course of inspection. Our task is outlined in Paragraph 3 of Article XI of the treaty—to verify on the spot the number of missiles declared by the American side as of the date the treaty entered into force."

Under the treaty, the verifying side has the right to remain at the inspection site for at least 24 hours. If necessary, the inspectors may prolong their stay for another eight hours. But this extra time was not needed by Kuznetsov and his colleagues. They saw everything they wanted to see. The data the American side gave them corresponded to the actual situation.

(The Soviet NC confirmed the US side's strict observance of the treaty.)

Next, the inspection report was made up and signed by both sides in Russian and in English in duplicate. One copy was left with the Americans, the other was brought to Moscow. The Soviet inspectors returned home July 5.

Impressions

Kuznetsov had never dealt with US servicemen before. In a less official situation the conversation would probably have been different. But under the circumstances everything was strictly regulated. Kuznetsov noted the Americans' respectful and businesslike attitude toward the Soviet inspectors. Both sides realized the importance of the treaty, and strictly observed its provisions. Vaguenesses and misunderstandings were quickly cleared up. Departing Travis, there was actually no customs examination though the Americans had originally wanted this.

...So, the first step has been taken. Inspectors of both sides have started to implement the treaty. We all—Soviet people and Americans, the people of other countries—want this unprecedented process of eliminating nuclear weapons to be a success. The first inspections have shown that both sides are ready to carry out the requirements of the INF Treaty.

Korionov Sees Progress on Regional Conflicts

PM2607080188 Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian
24 Jul 88 Second Edition p 4

[Vitaliy Korionov "International Review: "The World This Week"]

[Text]

Socialism's Appeal

The axis of international life is clearly turning away from confrontation toward cooperation, mutual understanding, and talks. But could it be said that a change for the better has already occurred? No, such a conclusion would be premature. The situation on the planet remains

complex and contradictory. Nonetheless, the trend toward improvement of interstate relations and talks is making its way across artificially created obstacles and accretions.

The signing of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles gave a new dimension to international relations and opened prospects for extending the disarmament process to other types of weapons. The chance that has emerged must not be missed. This is the appeal to countries and people by the Warsaw conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee.

The European Continent is now gaining a more realistic opportunity than ever before to cast off the yoke of armaments. Speaking of the proposals by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee contained in his speech at the Polish Sejm session, Andreas von Buelow, leading expert in military policy from the Social Democratic Party of Germany faction in the West German Bundestag, said: These proposals indicate once again the Soviet leadership's serious approach to disarmament and the groundlessness of NATO's deliberations about the supposed "propaganda nature of Moscow's actions."

Now these "actions" are backed by the strength and prestige of all Warsaw Pact countries. The realistic and constructive nature of these proposals has been backed by many eminent statesmen and politicians in West Europe, noting that the Warsaw Pact documents "open a window on Europe's future" and indicate further alignment of the positions of East and West. Not to waste time, not to miss any favorable chances through all sorts of procrastinations—this is how the question is posed today by sober-minded politicians in West Europe and the United States alike.

As regards NATO headquarters, hitherto it has only stated that the Warsaw Pact countries' proposals are being studied. Of course they should be studied, but it is essential to strike while the iron is hot. And NATO figures show no desire to do this. The West German newspaper *GENERAL-ANZEIGER* complains: The East has a comprehensive concept on the question of mutual reductions of armed forces and conventional arms in the event of talks commencing, but the West is unfortunately far from being in this position.

The adoption of the document "Consequences of the Arms Race for the Environment and Other Aspects of Ecological Security" offers tangible proof of the closeness of mankind's vital interests to the socialist countries' hearts.

Scientists, international and national public organizations, and the United Nations issue increasingly loud warnings about the ecological disaster threatening mankind. Some time ago Lester Brown, president of the "Worldwatch" Scientific Research Institute operating in

the United States, published a report entitled "The World Situation" which noted that "one of the most important indicators of the Earth's health—its forest cover" is now in a disastrous state. Some 11 million hectares of tropical forests disappear every year. Furthermore, 31 million hectares of forests in industrially developed countries have been damaged as a result of atmospheric pollution and "acid rain." Each year 26 billion tonnes of the Earth's fertile topsoil are being washed away by rain or blown away by winds, while desert areas increase by 6 million hectares. Thousands of flora and fauna species disappear. The U.S. experts did not limit themselves to diagnosis alone in their report. They calculated that, in order to restore the ecology's health, a sum of approximately \$150 billion would have to be spent each year for this purpose. The necessary funds, they declare, can be provided by reducing the world's military expenditure by just one-sixth of its current annual total of around \$900 billion.

It was this aspect of the matter that the Warsaw Pact states emphasized with full force. They declared that they give special attention to the danger posed to the environment and to life itself on our planet by the stockpiles of nuclear weapons, which are fraught with the threat of global devastation as a result of deliberate use, miscalculation, or accident. The socialist countries declared that they will continue to actively cooperate in the solution of immediate problems concerning the protection of the environment and protection against wars and the consequences of the arms race.

Becoming Part of Our Life

The 43d anniversary of the days when U.S. nuclear militarism cold-bloodedly used the atomic weapons it had created against Hiroshima and Nagasaki will be marked early next month. Since then the real threat of a nuclear apocalypse has hung over mankind. The Soviet Union has countered this danger by an expanded and realistic program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. When the Soviet Union named a specific date—the year 2000—for the solution of this task in its well-known 15 January 1986 statement, not many people in the world believed that its solution was feasible.

But in early August this year, explosions which will destroy the first batches of OTR-22 and OTR-23 missiles (known in the West as SS-12 and SS-23), due for elimination under the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, will be heard near Saryozek, Taldy-Kurgan Oblast. This will be the start of the countdown to practical nuclear disarmament. The Soviet idea of freeing mankind from the nuclear nightmare is being implemented.

Of course, movement in this direction is accompanied by major difficulties, but it is continuing nevertheless. We recently witnessed an event which would have been unimaginable 1-2 years ago: Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev, USSR first deputy defense minister and

chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, visited the United States at the invitation of Admiral W. Crowe, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. How unusual it was to see our television sets showing pictures of the Soviet red flag flying next to the U.S. flag at the Pentagon! A plan for contacts between the USSR and U.S. Armed Forces in 1988-1990, an extremely rich plan, was drawn up.

In accordance with the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, 70 Soviet inspectors are now in the United States carrying out inspections at U.S. Air Force facilities where missiles and missile components due for elimination are sited. At the same time, a group of U.S. inspectors arrived in the USSR headed by General R. Lajoie, director of the U.S. Department of Defense On-Site Inspection Agency.

A group of Soviet specialists is at the Nevada test site for next week's latest Soviet-U.S. experiment, which is meant to confirm the possibility of using currently available apparatus to establish reliable monitoring of underground nuclear explosions. A little later, a similar experiment will be carried out near Semipalatinsk, and a group of U.S. scientists has already arrived in the USSR to take part in it. In this way, the Soviet-U.S. accords reached during President R. Reagan's Moscow visit are yielding fruit.

The second Soviet-U.S. conference of retired generals and admirals, held in Moscow last week, is a link in the general chain of the development of USSR-U.S. relations. The actual topic of the conference—"Need for New Political and Military Thinking and for Specific Steps in the Disarmament Sphere"—offered an opportunity to review the stereotypes which are especially firmly rooted in the military sphere.

The front of the struggle for a nuclear-free and nonviolent world is expanding. Preparations are under way in Brazil for the unofficial meeting of representatives from 22 African and South American countries, due to open in that country's capital in the next few days to examine the question of creating a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic. We have before us yet another confirmation of the fact that countries and peoples are persistently seeking ways to free themselves from the danger of war.

Let me remind readers that it was 3 years ago, in August 1985, that a session of the South Pacific Forum countries held on Rarotonga Island (Cook Islands) proclaimed the Treaty on a Nuclear-Free Zone in the South Pacific. The USSR was the first nuclear power to sign Protocols No 2 and No 3 to the Rarotonga Treaty. As for the United States, it refused to join the treaty. The treaty came into force in December 1986. The intention of 22 African and South American countries to examine the question of

creating a zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic is a pleasing phenomenon against the background of incessant military activity by militarist forces in this part of the world.

Around the Negotiating Table

The new political thinking is gathering strength, offering an opportunity to solve questions which were getting tied into increasingly tight knots for years on end. Tangible proof of this can be seen in the emergence of a more favorable atmosphere for the peaceful settlement of regional armed conflicts which continue to tear our planet apart.

People both in the Soviet Union and all over the world welcome with great satisfaction Iran's decision to officially recognize UN Security Council Resolution 598 on the Iran-Iraq conflict. From the very start of the war in that region, the Soviet Union has persistently and consistently advocated the cessation of the senseless slaughter and the question's solution through a peaceful and all-embracing settlement on the basis of Resolution 598. These efforts, just like the efforts by other peace-loving states and the United Nations, are finally beginning to bear fruit. The United Nations is already sending military experts to Iran and Iraq to work out terms for a cease-fire agreement.

True enough, the fires of war are still raging there. Crimson clouds are still hanging over the Persian Gulf. Some typical data were published a few days ago in the United States: Since the United States launched its "shipping protection" operation a year ago, the number of incidents involving merchant ships in the Gulf has increased by 61 percent. Nonetheless, Washington insists that it does not intend to withdraw its military armada from these waters and will remain the "heavyweight" there, even though recent events have shown with particular clarity that this is a game involving the lives of totally innocent civilians. Israel is also trying to get mixed up in the process of blocking a peaceful settlement, fearing that a cessation of the Iran-Iraq war would narrow Tel Aviv's field for aggressive anti-Arab actions. Nevertheless, light can be seen at the end of the tunnel.

A few days ago, as a result of talks in New York, experts from Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, with U.S. mediation, succeeded in elaborating a document entitled "Principles of Peaceful Settlement in South West Africa," which has now been submitted for examination by the governments of the countries concerned. The joint communique states that "the discussions were held in a constructive spirit and were positive." It is envisaged that South African troops will withdraw from Angola. Angola and Cuba will move toward a gradual withdrawal of the Cuban contingent. A new round of talks is due to be held soon. Evidently, prospects are emerging for a start to be made on extinguishing the "minor war" in

that region too. Conditions are emerging for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 on Namibia, whose territory is used by Pretoria as its main bridgehead and support base for aggression against Angola. It is suggested that the permanent members of the Security Council would guarantee the freedom of every state in the region to pursue its development and social progress in conditions of peace.

As a result of the national reconciliation policy persistently pursued by the PRK Government, a qualitatively new situation is developing in the process of a Cambodian settlement. It had already been reported that the SRV had announced that one-half of the Vietnamese volunteers now in Cambodia, in other words 50,000 men, would be withdrawn from there in 1988. The command of Vietnamese volunteers remaining in Cambodia for the time being had been handed over to the PRK Defense Ministry. Representatives of governments, international organizations, and all those with an interest in the Cambodian problem have been invited to observe the troop withdrawal, which will be completed not later than 1990. It was noted during the 20 July Kremlin meeting between the Soviet and Vietnamese leaders that the upcoming "unofficial meeting" in Jakarta (journalists are already dubbing it the "cocktail party") will help to deepen mutual understanding between the Indochina and ASEAN states.

It is becoming increasingly evident that the conclusion of the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan has provided an incentive for solving armed conflicts in other parts of the world on the basis of the principles of national reconciliation. There can be no argument that this is a very complex process. This is clearly visible from the example of Afghanistan itself, where the process of national reconciliation is fraught with difficulties that have to be combated. The counterrevolution is furiously resisting. A total of 177 missiles were launched against Kabul on 15, 17, 19, and 20 July alone, killing 75 civilians, including 21 children, and injuring 97 persons. Cities and population centers in other provinces in the country have come under fire in the last few days. Large consignments of weapons for counterrevolutionary detachments are still being shipped from Pakistani territory, and training centers for the Afghan opposition are still operating there. Moreover, according to press reports, there has been a recent increase in the number of foreign advisers, including Americans, among the groups of "implacables" who are conducting military operations in Afghanistan's territory.

Nonetheless, the policy of national reconciliation is making its way in Afghanistan and elsewhere on the planet. A great future lies ahead for it.

Weekly 'International Observers Roundtable'
LD2407174988 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1130 GMT 24 Jul 88

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Vladimir Georgievich Pasko, All-Union Radio commentator; Boris Dmitriyevich Pyadyshev, USSR Foreign

Ministry collegium member and editor in chief of MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN; and Vitaliy Yakovlevich Chukseyev, TASS collegium member and chief foreign news editor]

[Excerpts] [Pasko] Hello, comrades. Today, as we direct our gaze, according to tradition, to the most major events of the past week—and there are many—I think we need to say something first of all about the extensive response throughout the world to the documents of the Warsaw conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact countries, and to the Soviet initiatives for strengthening international security, which came a few days before the conference, during Comrade Gorbachev's friendly official visit to Poland.

I refer to the statement by the allied states regarding talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, a statement which was intended to stimulate the beginning of the appropriate talks; our proposal for a summit meeting of all the European countries, including, of course, the United States and Canada, to discuss the question of how to progress from words to actions in the sphere of conventional arms reduction; the proposal that the United States could lower the level of military confrontation in Europe by refraining from transferring their F-16 aircraft from Spain to Italy, in exchange for a reduction of our analogous forward-based aircraft in Eastern Europe; the suggested establishment of a European center for reducing the danger of war and preventing sudden attack; and, finally, the appeal that was made at the session in Warsaw for pooling efforts on a global and a European scale to preserve the natural environment and to convene a general European conference of ministers responsible for its protection.

The allied socialist states are willing to cooperate with all countries for the purpose of solving the vital problems that confront mankind. What attitude has been taken to the proposals made in Warsaw?

[Pyadyshev] I do not think I will be in error if I say that if one looks at the decisions of previous meetings of the Warsaw Pact and the speeches of Soviet representatives at respected international official forums of recent years, our country, the socialist countries, have every time unfailingly put forward new initiatives in the sphere of disarmament. That is why, this time also, the results of the session of the Political Consultative Committee were awaited with great interest throughout the world. Judging by the reactions, those hopes have been justified. Here is what French President Mitterrand said on the subject: When I heard Mr Gorbachev advocating the idea that we should reduce conventional arms, I thought that demarche should be encouraged; for the first time since World War II, disarmament was being suggested instead of an upgrading of arms—and it is France's duty to support that movement.

In the opinion of West German Foreign Minister Genscher the results of that conference are an important contribution to strengthening East-West relations and developing the dialogue on disarmament. He noted that the content of the statement by the Warsaw Pact shows that the positions of the socialist countries and NATO are coming closer together.

It so happened that the session in Warsaw was held just before a session of the Common Market at the foreign minister level in Athens. Although, as observers remark, the main issue on the agenda of that very representative Western meeting was originally to have been combatting terrorism, most of its attention was devoted to the program of reducing armed forces and arms put forward by the Warsaw Pact. As indicated in a special press statement, the ministers of the 12 countries of the European Economic Community consider that a number of the ideas contained in the final communique reflect positions that have for a long time been supported by the countries of the EEC. This positive development, they say, should not be embodied in action.

What has been the reaction of NATO, to which these proposals were actually addressed? A NATO spokesman has announced that the Atlantic alliance will study the Warsaw Pact communique with the greatest care before commenting on its substance. Not without interest in this connection is an article in the Japanese newspaper ASAHI, which says: The member countries of NATO intend to draw up proposals of their own as a matter of urgency, so that the West, which has suffered a blow on the propaganda level, may regain the initiative.

If the West is going to regard this as merely an exchange of propaganda blows, then once again a real chance for progress along the road of reducing the threat of war will have been lost.

Much attention is being given abroad to those proposals by the Warsaw Pact states that concern reducing conventional arms. It needs to be said that the conventional arms we have today are not at all innocuous. They are innocuous neither militarily nor economically. It is wrong to imagine that less money, less resources, are spent on missiles, on strategic arms, than on the so-called conventional types of armament. Take for example a U.S. atomic aircraft carrier, which counts as a conventional weapon: It costs about 3 or 4 billion dollars, which is a lot more than the cost of any other category of strategic armaments. The fact that the Soviet Union, together with its Warsaw Pact allies, is now concentrating on the need to reduce conventional arms is important both in the sense of reducing the threat of war generally, and in the sense of relieving our national economic life of the excessive burdens of military expenditure.

In the West, especially in the countries of Western Europe, our proposal for a general European center for reducing the danger of war in Europe has attracted attention. It should be said that this is unprecedented. No country has ever made such a proposal before. The idea is that by their joint, collective efforts, all the states

participating in the general European process should set up, anywhere, in one of the European countries, an international center in which representatives of all 35 states participating in the general European process would take part. The Polish Government has already offered to have the headquarters of such a center on Polish territory. The center could undertake to coordinate efforts to gather and check information regarding the numerical strength of armed forces and armaments on the European Continent. It would keep an eye on the situation, above all on the borders between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Should the need arise, the center could send teams to verify a situation, and if the situation became threatening, it could send inspection groups to check initial data on forces and armaments, their location, and so on. That is how we see the purpose of the center. In our opinion, it could have regional branches, or national centers, in addition to the general European center. In short, this is a proposal of very great political and military value.

[Chukseyev] As for the prospects of reducing armed forces and conventional arms, this will depend to a large extent on the line taken by the United States. At present, to put it mildly, it does not inspire any great enthusiasm. State Department and Pentagon spokesmen have rushed to reject both the proposal for a general European meeting on conventional arms control and the proposal concerning forward-based air forces in Europe. This inflexible behavior undoubtedly is dictated primarily by the domestic political situation. The U.S. Administration is just not willing to consider any serious changes in its outlook on foreign policy or military matters with a little over 3 months to go before the elections. The big question for the United States—and it still remains open—is who will occupy the White House: the current vice president, Bush, or his Democratic rival, Dukakis.

[Pasko] In talking about the week's events, one cannot, of course, omit mention of the national convention of the U.S. Democratic Party—one of the two major bourgeois parties in the United States, which take turns forming the administration and, with it, shaping the country's course in foreign affairs. I think listeners will be familiar with the results of the convention: Dukakis, the governor of Massachusetts, and Texas Senator Bentsen were elected as the candidates for the posts of president and vice president, and the party's election platform was approved for the decisive stage of the fight for the White House before the November elections. It is a document that merits special attention, I think. Some polls put Dukakis ahead of his Republican rival, so it is not impossible that the Democrats will shortly be determining the U.S. line on the international stage, and that includes disarmament issues.

One gathers from the reports that the Democratic platform does not include any proposals for a freeze on military spending or a U.S. undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The draft confines itself to calling for more stable military budgets and emphasizing

the need for the allies to take on a greater share of NATO expenditure. On armaments, the document speaks of a desire for a mutual and verifiable agreement to reduce strategic and conventional arms, ban chemical weapons and armaments in space, and stop nuclear tests.

Commenting on the draft document, THE NEW YORK TIMES noted that the authors clearly have endeavored not to frighten off the moderates and therefore have not put forward a single specific proposal to distinguish the Democratic Party from the Republicans in a way advantageous to the former. But what might this mean for us, for the disarmament talks, for Soviet-U.S. relations?

[Pyadyshev] We have to start from the fact that the electoral platforms of U.S. political parties and the practical activities of the administration formed after the presidential election—these practical activities begin in January of next year—are far from one and the same thing. The election slogans with which the political parties are trying to gain the White House are one thing, and the policy which the ruling elite actually pursues is another. So, when analyzing the Democratic Party's current political platform, we have to bear in mind the changes of course toward the practical amendments which the future president—if he is a Democratic president—will inevitably make to his policies under the influence of various factors, circumstances, and forces.

At this point, comrades, allow us to bring our meeting today to an end. Thank you. All the best.

TASS Analysis of Warsaw Pact Proposal
LD2507120888 Moscow TASS in English
1154 GMT 25 Jul 88

[“Warsaw Treaty Proposals on Arms and Troops Cuts—Analysis”—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow July 25, TASS—Scaling down armed forces and conventional armaments and eliminating imbalances in these fields are of key importance to reducing the risk of outbreak of war and creating a more stable situation in Europe.

In the West, however, they often demand that the Warsaw Treaty members cut back their weapons and troops unilaterally.

The Soviet Union believes that there can be no question of removing imbalances in Europe unilaterally as this would violate the principle of justice and upset the rough military parity existing in the continent between the armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO.

The view is shared by other European socialist countries and this has been graphically reflected in the documents adopted by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty nations at its session in the Polish capital.

Meeting earlier in Budapest in 1986, the committee put forward a program for reducing armed forces and armaments in the continent, which takes into account the structure of the armed forces on either side.

This program was further elaborated by the committee at its meeting in Berlin in 1987.

Fundamentally new proposals have been made by the Political Consultative Committee in the Polish capital.

The Warsaw Treaty countries believe, for example, that the ultimate objective of the first phase of the talks should be to achieve roughly equal, balanced collective levels as regards troops strength and the amount of conventional arms for the states grouped in the two military-political alliances.

The balanced levels should be lower than existing now on either side.

The second phase is to see the armed forces of each side slashed by about 25 percent (by some 500,000 men) along with their organic arms.

The aim of the third phase should be to lend the armed forces of both sides a purely defensive nature through further cuts.

Much significance is, of course, attached to establishing an effective verification system to monitor compliance with the accords.

The realization of the latest initiatives of the Warsaw Treaty countries could, without doubt, provide the foundation on which the nations of the continent could begin building a "common European home."

NATO's Woerner Views Arms, CSCE Talks
*LD2607130088 Moscow TASS in English
1157 GMT 26 Jul 88*

[Text] Bonn July 26 TASS—NATO secretary general gave an interview to the DPA agency where he expressed the hope that the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would soon agree, within the framework of the Vienna meeting, all questions pertaining to the start of the talks on cutting armed forces and conventional weapons. He counts on the start of these talks even this year, he noted.

Woerner spoke out against hinging the start of conventional weapons talks on drafting by NATO countries of a joint concept for disarmament. In his words, the West will be able to present a concept taking into account all aspects of the policy of security and control over armaments by the summer of the next year.

The NATO secretary general ducked the question whether the North Atlantic bloc was ready to hold parallel talks on conventional weapons and on cutting

and subsequent elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. He tried again to ascribe to the Warsaw Treaty "ability for a surprise attack", alleging that the West had no such cuts in the near future in the strength of U.S. troops in Europe where, according to the DPA agency, there are at present some 325,000 U.S. troops.

TASS Observer Views Current CSCE Talks
LD2607235088 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1720 GMT 27 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow, 26 Jul (TASS)—TASS political observer Vladimir Matyash writes:

The CSCE meeting is nearing its end. Delegations from 35 countries in Europe, the United States and Canada are working on a document which is to sum up the Vienna forum and define the further development of the European process for creating a favorable political atmosphere on the continent. Thus, the meeting participants have reached the home stretch. The preparations for a new program for ensuring security and developing cooperation in Europe, and the continuation of detente, depend on their realism and political will.

An important stimulus for the Vienna meeting was provided by the new Soviet initiatives, aimed at reducing conventional weapons and armed forces in Europe, recently advanced in Warsaw by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

In the military-political field, the meeting succeeded in reaching an accord in principle that in 1988, within the pan-European process, negotiations will begin on cutting back armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. At the same time, the conference on confidence-building and security measures and disarmament in Europe will continue. On the issue of reopening the conference on confidence-building and security measures and disarmament in Europe, it is believed that the forum will continue to deal with solving disarmament problems with the participation of all 35 CSCE states.

The Warsaw Pact states at the conference worked out real confidence-building and security measures that aim at reducing the risk of military confrontation in Europe. Such measures, in the view of the USSR, should not apply only to activity on land but also to naval and air force activity. But NATO objects to the application of confidence-building measures to independent naval and air force activity, highlighting the issues of expanding the exchange of information about the structure and posting of armed forces, as well as the further development of the on-site inspection system.

In issues relating to the international legal bases of security and cooperation in Europe, the socialist countries advocate strengthening the efficacy of all 10 principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and advocate effective steps to implement the provisions of the Final Act and the other CSCE documents both in legislation

and in practice. However, some Western delegations are generally opposed to having the document reflect a readiness to conscientiously fulfill their obligations in respect to international law.

Mediterranean problems occupy one of the central positions. In Mikhail Gorbachev's address to the Yugoslav Assembly on 16 March, the Soviet Union backed the proposals by Yugoslavia, Cyprus, and Malta to convene a broad conference of CSCE member states on the whole package of problems of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean. The position of the USSR and the other socialist countries is crystal clear here: solve problems connected with strengthening stability and the prevention of regional conflicts in the Mediterranean region.

The Soviet Union is striving to fill the final document with provisions that would create favorable conditions for mutually beneficial trade, cooperation in scientific and technical spheres, and the protection of the environment. This is considerably furthered by the processes of restructuring and radical economic reforms which are opening up wide opportunities for a new stage of development, one that applies to the entire package of economic cooperation between East and West. But some people in the West are stubbornly clinging to expanding the list of goods that come under the notorious COCOM (the list of goods which it is forbidden to sell to the socialist countries now contains 300,000 items), and various types of embargoes and sanctions and other discriminatory measures against the socialist countries have been tightened.

Finally, the Soviet Union believes human rights and humanitarian issues, which have long been an irritant in East-West relations, should be switched into a channel of practical interaction between member states. There has been a perceptible advance in the mechanism proposed by the USSR of mutual information, consultations, and cooperation in this sphere, one that is important to all. It is intended that within the framework of this mechanism, the member states will be able to exchange information on the human-rights situation and the humanitarian field as a whole in CSCE countries, and to hold meetings or consultations of experts to examine humanitarian cases with the aim of resolving them.

Soviet Preparations To Destroy Missiles

LD2707132988 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 0828 GMT 27 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow, 27 Jul (ADN)—The USSR will set about the destruction of the OTR-22 and OTR-23 missiles withdrawn from the territory of the GDR and CSSR next Monday near the Kazakh village of Saryozek, close to Alma-Ata, the Soviet press has announced. This will be the practical implementation of the Treaty Between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles of the two countries. An operational group under Colonel Stanislav

Petrenko, head of the administration for the destruction of shorter-range missiles of the USSR Ground Forces, has already gone to the destruction site.

The preparations to explode the missiles were introduced immediately after the signing of the Soviet-U.S. treaty, Colonel Petrenko said. In January this year, the Center for the Reduction of Nuclear Risks was set up at the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. Centers were set up at those facilities that had intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in order to oversee their destruction. The Ground Forces, Colonel Petrenko continued, would themselves destroy their missiles in Saryozek. The launch ramps and transportation facilities will be eliminated not far from the settlement of Stankovo near Minsk. Within 1 and 1/2 years, reckoned from the exchange of ratification documents, that would be a total of 238 launch ramps, 150 transportation facilities, and 937 combat and 311 exercise missiles.

Apart from a U.S. inspection group, a delegation of the World Peace Council and foreign correspondents will witness the destruction.

U.S. INF Inspector Interviewed in Ulan-Ude

LD2707170788 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0330 GMT 27 Jul 88

[Text] A group of Soviet inspectors has arrived at Travis Air Force Base, near San Francisco. They are monitoring the implementation of provisions of the INF Treaty. This group will join the 22 Soviet experts who are in Magna, Utah where there is a plant producing components for Pershing-2 missiles, which are to be destroyed according to the treaty. A similar group of U.S. experts is working in our country. Here is what Monko Achirov, our Ulan-Ude correspondent, reports:

[Achirov] At Ulan-Ude airport, everybody is now used to the presence of C-141 military transport aircraft at the end of the tarmac. The group of inspectors monitoring [kontrol] the implementation of the INF Treaty is headed by Brigadier General Roland Lajoie, director of the corresponding administration of the U.S. Defense Department.

[Begin recording] [Lajoie] All the initial inspections have gone very well. On our side, we have completed about 50 inspections of Soviet bases in the USSR, the GDR, and the CSSR. Your inspectors have not been wasting their time either. They have carried out 13 inspections in the United States and at U.S. bases in Western Europe.

[Achirov] Could you speak about the working conditions created for your inspectors in Ulan-Ude? Maybe your staff has reported to you?

[Lajoie] I must admit that, although I have worked for 5 years in our embassy, I have never been in Ulan-Ude. But the treaty gave me the opportunity to see this area. It is my first visit. All my inspectors—who, as I have

already said, have completed about 20 inspections here—have said that they were well organized, that they were well received; they have no complaints. Everything has been okay.

[Achirov] For the first time since World War II the U.S. and Soviet military become partners in combined work.

[Lajoie] I think this is good. It is high time to take such a step and this step is in the right direction. You know, the treaty [words indistinct] but the purpose of this treaty is simple and it consists in eliminating [word indistinct] of missiles. We all are for this purpose and we all are happy to play at least a small part in this process. [end recording]

U.S. Applies 'Double Standard' to Disarmament

*LD2807193988 Moscow TASS in English
1922 GMT 28 Jul 88*

[Text] Moscow July 28 TASS—By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev

Max Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms, tries to take advantage of problems of verification of the observance of the drafted agreements on disarmament in order to achieve unilateral military advantages for the United States.

In an interview to the West German magazine *DER SPIEGEL* Kampelman, specifically, said that the difficulties with counting mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) should be removed by banning and destroying these weapon systems. Meanwhile the head of the U.S. delegation proposes to resolve similar difficulties in verification of the number of submarine-launched cruise missiles by quite a different way—by lifting all restrictions on development and deployment of SLCM.

Kampelman himself explains such "double standards" in the solution of similar problems. According to him, "Russians have a considerable edge" in Mobile ICBM, so these missiles should be banned and eliminated. The United States is ahead for the number of submarine-launched cruise missiles. So, according to Kampelman, the problem of verification should be resolved by giving Americans a free hand in the further upgrading and quantitative build-up of SLCM. Why is it that the United States does not want to resolve the problem of monitoring submarine-launched cruise missiles by inspection of ships, the correspondent of *DER SPIEGEL* asked Kampelman. It must be admitted that the answer of the American diplomat was quite candid. He said the United States does not have the slightest intention to conclude such agreements as would restrict the U.S. Naval Force.

Just a few years ago Washington presented itself as favouring in principle the strictest measures of verification of the observance of any agreements with the Soviet

Union. The problem of on-site inspections any time and in any area has been the hobby-horse of U.S. diplomats over decades. It is no secret that the U.S. side has used this problem in the past also for disrupting agreements that did not suit Washington.

Times have changed. Washington's claims to the role of a champion of openness in the military area have weakened considerably during the latest rounds of talks with the Soviet Union on strategic offensive arms.

It is characteristic that the disintegration of the myth about the United States' unshakeable adherence to the idea of comprehensive on-site verification also revealed Washington's real and unsavoury stand concerning "equal and balanced" reductions in some classes of strategic offensive arms.

Missile Launch Documents Submitted in Geneva

*PM2907094288 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 Jul 88 Second Edition p 7*

[TASS report: "At the Geneva Conference"]

[Text] Geneva, 28 Jul—At the disarmament conference today, the USSR delegation, in parallel with the U.S. delegation, submitted as official documents the text of the joint statement at summit level in Moscow and the text of the agreement between the USSR and the United States on notifications of launches of ICBM's and SLBM's.

Preparations for U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Experiment

*LD2907084288 Moscow TASS in English
0822 GMT 9 Jul 88*

[Text] San Francisco July 29 TASS—By TASS correspondent Yuriy Algunov:

Practically everything is ready for a Soviet-U.S. experiment on the main nuclear test site of the U.S. Department of Energy in Nevada. John Walsh, an official spokesman of the test site administration, told TASS.

32 Soviet experts are now working in Mercury where the site's administrative centre is located.

They came to Nevada in two groups in April and June. Last spring, they participated in a series of joint research which helped improve methods of taking check measurements and processing seismic data obtained during nuclear testing.

Walsh said that the goal of the programme was the development of reliable methods of checking yields of nuclear test explosions.

This was exceptionally important from the viewpoint of verification of agreements concluded by the sides, including the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty, he went on.

The participants in the joint experiments seek also to promote the Soviet-U.S. intergovernmental talks on a nuclear test ban in Geneva.

Walsh said that joint efforts by Soviet and American scientists helped build confidence and understanding between the two powers, adding that without them further steps in the field of arms control were just unthinkable.

The scientists have already corrected, to a large measure, the divergence in the sides' assessment of yields of underground nuclear tests in the past years.

The experiments near Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan last year and in Nevada this year unequivocally showed that even low-yield nuclear tests cannot go unnoticed.

In mid-August, approximately between August 14 and 18, a nuclear device of a specific yield will be detonated at a depth of about 700 metres.

Using precision seismic instruments to be located at various distances from the explosion epicentre, scientists are to restore the main parameters of the charge and compare them with original data.

A group of American experts are now preparing, together with Soviet colleagues, for another experiment in Semipalatinsk.

Correx measurement equipment, which was used on the Nevada test site, has recently been brought to Kazakhstan.

Walsh described the joint work as very interesting and productive.

He said that the good organisation of preliminary work, high skills of experts and desire of both sides to achieve positive results left no doubt that the forthcoming experiment in Nevada would be successful.

Destruction Process of RSD-10 Missiles

*LD2907073788 Moscow TASS in English
0647 GMT 29 Jul 88*

[Text] Moscow July 29 TASS—The Soviet intermediate range missiles RSD-10 to be destroyed under the Soviet-American INF Treaty will be scrapped in the missile range Kapustin yar (in the lower reaches of the Volga River).

Twice a month, on the 15th and 30th, for three years explosions will rock the range. Seventy-five per cent of the stocks of the missiles RSD-10 are to be destroyed there. On each of those days, nine missiles, three in a bundle at a time, will be destroyed through setting off the second stages of the missiles and an additional charge (700-750 kg of TNT). These operations have been practised with the use of training missiles. The explosion will

leave a crater 15-18 metres deep and 45 metres in diameter. The wrecks of a blasted missile completely burn down in a matter of 35 seconds. Bulldozers in operation in the range will fill up the craters and prepare the ground for the next scrapping procedure. According to the schedule, 80 per cent of the missiles to be scrapped there will be destroyed in the course of the first stage (29 months), and the remaining 20 per cent—in the course of the subsequent seven months.

Only one of the components of the weapon will be destroyed in Kapustin yar—the missile in container. The two other elements of the complex—the self-propelled launcher and the transport vehicle will be "disarmed" in the Sarny elimination base in the Ukraine. Later hoists with a cargo lifting capacity of up to 120 tonnes will be mounted on the chassis of the scrapped missiles at the Odessa heavy-duty crane building amalgamation in cooperation with the West German Liebherr company. The cranes are designed for use in civil engineering.

Soviets Inspect U.S. Air Base in Netherlands

Inspection Begins 29 July

*LD2907225188 Moscow TASS in English
1857 GMT 29 Jul 88*

[Text] The Hague July 29 TASS—A ten-member group of Soviet inspectors that arrived in the Netherlands started today the holding of inspections at the U.S. Air Force base in Woensdrecht. The inspection is implemented in accordance with the provisions of the verification of the observance of the Soviet-American agreement on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles.

As is known, the Netherlands is one of five West European NATO countries that agreed to deploy U.S. cruise missiles on their territories. The first of the 48 missiles meant to be deployed on the Netherlands' territory were to arrive in Woensdrecht late this year. But the conclusion of the Soviet-American treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and its subsequent ratification have led to the fact that the missiles have not been deployed on the Netherlands' territory.

Inspection Completed 31 July

*LD3107143488 Moscow TASS in English
1418 GMT 31 Jul 88*

[Text] The Hague July 31 TASS—A team of 10 Soviet inspectors, staying in the Netherlands, today completed inspections at the U.S. Airforce Base in Woensdrecht. The inspections are performed in accordance with the provisions on verification of the observance of the Soviet-American treaty on the liquidation of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

The Soviet specialists were accompanied by 12 U.S. experts. Earlier such inspections had been held at four U.S. military installations in Great Britain and West Germany.

As a spokesman for the Soviet team told newsmen in the Hague, the work proceeded in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and met the interests of both sides.

The first of the 48 missiles intended for deployment in the territory of the Netherlands were to arrive at the U.S. Airforce Base in Woensdrecht late this year. Underground silos for their deployment were already under construction. Following the entry of the INF Treaty into force the construction was discontinued. The computer control centre for monitoring the launching of the nuclear missiles, built there last autumn, was also dismantled.

Ulan-Ude Arrival of U.S. INF Inspectors Noted
*LD2907234388 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1430 GMT 29 Jul 88*

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Since 1 July U.S. experts have been inspecting military installations in our country in accordance with the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. Ulan-Ude airport has been working as an international airport for a month now. U.S. military transport aircraft land on the airfield's concrete strip. Ulan-Ude is one of the reception centers for the U.S. inspectors in the Soviet Union to carry out the verification and monitoring of fulfillment by the Soviet side of the adopted obligations. This time a group of inspectors has arrived here headed by Brigadier General Lodgeway, director of the On-Site Inspection Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense. The U.S. experts have carried out some 20 inspections via Ulan-Ude. At the beginning of August in Taldy-Kurgan Oblast, the first clusters of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles will be destroyed. [video shows shots of transport aircraft landing, group of men being greeted on tarmac]

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] To what extent are these obligations being fulfilled, that's the first question, and second, is an atmosphere of absolute trust between countries possible?

[Lodgeway, speaking in English with superimposed Russian translation] In my view, relations between the two countries were relatively difficult after the war, and I believe that there were various reasons for this. But I think, nonetheless, that relations remain difficult. Now, after the signing of the treaty to reduce intermediate- and shorter-range missiles the atmosphere between the two countries will gradually become normal. I do not think that after the signing of the treaty to reduce intermediate- and shorter-range missiles all matters relating to the security of our countries will be resolved, since this treaty makes provision for a small percentage reduction

in the overall quantity of missiles. Nonetheless, I believe that this step will be an important landmark on the path of normalizing our relations and will lay the foundations for a reduction of nuclear weapons. [end recording]

Military Officers Comment on Site Inspections

PM0108141388 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 29 Jul 88 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Colonel Vladimir Nikolayevich Bitskiy and Lieutenant Colonel Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Murashchenkov by correspondent Colonel A. Belousov under the rubric "Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles in Action": "With Inspector's Mandate"; date and place not given—first paragraph is Krasnaya Zvezda introduction]

[Text] Krasnaya Zvezda has already described how servicemen are preparing to destroy missiles in accordance with the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. The actual process of the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, launchers, and auxiliary equipment will begin in the very near future. We will publish items on the progress of their elimination and the implementation of monitoring the observance of the provisions of the treaty under the rubric "Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles in Action." Today we offer for our readers' attention a talk between our correspondent and Colonel Vladimir Nikolayevich Bitskiy, who accompanied the U.S. inspectors in our country, and Lieutenant Colonel Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Murashchenkov, who took part in the inspection of establishments on U.S. territory.

[Belousov] First a question for you, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich. You were among the first Soviet inspectors to travel across the ocean on such a responsible mission. What were your impressions?

A. Murashchenkov: I have already visited the United States twice. The first time, in early July, the object of our inspection was the Dugway test range (Utah). It has been declared eliminated; that is, missile tests can no longer be carried out on it. We had to be convinced of this on the spot. After a 17-hour flight with a stopover in Khabarovsk, our Il-62M landed not far from San Francisco. We were given quarters at an Air Force base. Conditions were normal. Our escorts, it is true, advised us for our own safety not to go outside the territory which was guarded and patrolled. At 2100 local time we presented the Americans with a statement indicating the site of the inspection. Until then they had not known precisely which establishment we intended to inspect. At 0200 hours we flew to the Dugway testing range. It is an enormous salt desert surrounded by a mountain range. So there was room to spread ourselves....

Good business contacts had been established with the U.S. specialists after 1 and 1/2 to 2 hours of joint work, although some tension was initially felt. Perhaps we

ourselves were partly to blame. For instance, I had never been abroad before and had never communicated with foreigners—how could I fail to be agitated? But it all worked out. Our U.S. escorts turned out to be sociable, well-meaning people. As specialists they have an excellent knowledge of their business. They gave exhaustive explanations to all our questions.

[Belousov] But how do our escorts feel in their work with U.S. inspectors?

V. Bitskiy: No difficulties or misunderstandings of any kind arose here either. Of our officers A. Shilo, A. Kunavine, and N. Telichko, I have only one thing to say: They are responsible people! They know their business to perfection. Of course, it is sometimes a little difficult. After all, we are on an hour's standby. It does happen that you have finished work and arrived home and there is a call: "You must be at Sheremetyevo in an hour's time; an automobile has been sent...." And then, no more than 9 hours later, you must deliver the inspection group to the verification site. And that is with our distances! But several dozen establishments have already been inspected in our country and there have been no breakdowns.

[Belousov] Can an inspection be canceled?

V. Bitskiy: In principle, yes. But only if it cannot be held by reason of force majeure. For instance, because the weather is unsuitable for flying. But the total number of inspections to which the inspecting side is entitled is not reduced.

[Belousov] Vladimir Nikolayevich, at present, when the elimination of missiles has not yet begun, what is the point of the inspections which are being held?

V. Bitskiy: The updated figures for the number of missile means as of the date the treaty entered into force are being monitored. The inspectors may have another question: Have they been given the correct type of missile to survey? During the last inspection at the Kapustin Yar testing range, we encountered precisely this situation. Of several RSD-10 missiles the inspectors pinpointed one and made a written application: Dismantle it, they said, we want to measure the stages. What did that mean for our specialists? Within a limited time they had to take the missile from its container and disconnect the stages.... Yet it was an operational [boyevaya] missile—without its nuclear charge device, but with fuel and inflammable elements.... Such work had never been performed on a test range before. The precision of sappers was needed. Safety measures were, of course, observed and the inspectors were asked to move further away. No, they wanted to see everything with their own eyes. Colonel O. Ovchinnikov so organized the matter that the schedule was observed down to the minute. Then, when the measurements had been taken, the

missile was driven to a combat field and blown up because it was dangerous to keep it in its dismantled form. That essentially is how the first elimination of an RSD-10 took place.

[Belousov] We will destroy a considerable proportion of our missiles by the explosion and launching method. But which method do the Americans prefer?

A. Murashchenkov: During our second trip we visited the Longhorn munitions plant in Texas, which the U.S. side has declared to be the site for the elimination of the Pershing-2 missiles. Combustion can be carried out at the plant. The missile stage is installed on a special stand (missile tests have been carried out on it previously) and is launched in the conventional procedure. But it cannot fly anywhere because it is firmly attached. If, for instance, a defect is discovered in the missile and it cannot be burned for this reason, it will be blown up.

[Belousov] Did you survey the entire plant?

A. Murashchenkov: No. We were shown only that part of the territory defined as the site for elimination.

[Belousov] How were matters with regard to communications, transport, and catering:

A. Murashchenkov: Everything was organized quite precisely.

V. Bitskiy: We did have problems with catering. For instance, Ukrainian borsch figured on the menu. But our guests did not order it. Our cooks were worried: Surely they had not made it badly? It turned out that no, it was simply that our guests had never tried it. And they did not know how much it contained of what. For them that is very important. So now we have decided to write the name of the dish and its ingredients on the menu. I think our guests will be pleased and our cooks will not be distressed to no avail.

As a whole the experience of joint work shed light on our mutual interest in punctiliously fulfilling the treaty's provisions and ensuring that the complete elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range Soviet and U.S. missiles becomes a fait accompli.

Military Writer, Officials on Weapon Elimination

Bogachev: Unprecedented Disarmament

LD2907195588 Moscow TASS in English
1933 GMT 29 Jul 88

[Text] Moscow July 29 TASS—By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

The process of the elimination of Soviet and American intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles will start on August 1. Missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons will be destroyed not for the reason that they have

become obsolete or ineffective, but for the reason that they are too dangerous for humanity. This act of real nuclear disarmament without precedent in history will be implemented in accordance with the Soviet-American INF Treaty.

In the course of three years the Soviet side will destroy 1,752 missiles that are either deployed or are in storage, that have the range of from 500 to 5,500 km. The Americans announced that they will destroy 859 such missiles. Bilateral elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles will result in a considerable lowering of the level of military confrontation in Europe. In the lessening of the risk of all-out nuclear war which could have catastrophic consequences for the entire humanity.

It is also important that the two countries, having agreed on the unprecedented measures of real nuclear disarmament, are implementing them under an unprecedented control with the use of various forms of on-site inspections. The very fact of joint control creates conditions for confidence-building. As the sides get convinced that the obligations assumed are strictly observed, the level of confidence will undoubtedly be enhanced.

The first inspections carried out in the USSR and the USA mainly for the purpose of checking the actual number of missiles against the data presented by both sides, have passed successfully. Soviet inspectors who visited U.S. bases note that Americans treated them as partners in the work which is conducted on the territory of the USA and on the territory of the USSR. Head of the group of inspectors from the USA, Captain Second Class John Williams, noted that during the arrangement of U.S. inspections in the USSR, Soviet representatives manifested high professionalism and attentiveness. He told newsmen that one could only dream about the hospitality accorded them in the USSR. Inspectors of both countries will be present during all the acts of the destruction of missiles. Part of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles will be destroyed by explosions.

Explosions usually cause concern of people. But the explosions in August at bases of the USSR and USA will, undoubtedly, revive the hopes of peoples for a better future.

'Conversation' With Gen Bugrov
LD3107124788 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0800 GMT 31 Jul 88

[Text] A Krasnaya Zvezda correspondent has spoken to Major-General Bugrov, deputy chief of staff of the Central Asian Military Okrug. He is responsible for preparing and carrying out the elimination of shorter-range missiles in the Saryozek area. I would like to acquaint you with the contents of their conversation.

The day and time for starting the elimination have already been fixed. In precise accordance with the provisions of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, the first operational explosion will be carried out at the elimination site at 1200 Moscow time on 1 August. At exactly midnight on the night of 31 July-1 August as specified in the treaty, the missiles due for destruction—four OTR-22 class missiles—will start to be brought out into the operational area. Subsequently, events will proceed as follows. At 0500 Moscow time, the missiles placed on the detonation site will be presented by us to the U.S. inspection group. Only after that will we start to place blasting material on the cluster of missiles due for elimination.

Representatives of antiwar organizations from foreign countries and of the Soviet public and journalists who have been invited to the elimination site will be able to observe the work of the military sappers. As soon as the missiles have been tied around with explosives, we will show our visitors how the the missiles have been prepared for elimination from a specially prepared location.

A viewing platform has been set up at a safe distance to allow the actual blast to be observed. Twenty minutes before the explosion, we will complete work to lay the detonation circuits and check that they are working properly. A traffic control and regulating service has been organized. The area has been cordoned off with guard posts everywhere where outside persons or grazing livestock could happen to stray. It has already been stated repeatedly that all operations to eliminate missiles in the Saryozek area are harmless to the environment. Nevertheless, a special service will be carrying out continuous monitoring of pollution of the air, water, and soil and analyzing the effect of the explosions on the environment.

Gen Batenin Interviewed

LD3007221388 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 30 Jul 88

[Interview with General Gelyi Batenin by Oleg Vakulovskiy; date and place not given—recorded; Batenin remarks in Russian fading into English translation; Vakulovskiy questions read by announcer]

[Text] [Announcer] Judging by reaction in the West the three-stage plan to cut armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe put forward by the Warsaw Treaty recently has real chances to materialize. Such is the assessment given by General Gelyi Batenin, military expert with the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee. He was speaking in an interview with Radio Moscow's Oleg Vakulovskiy. We now bring you that interview in English transcript.

After the Warsaw Treaty summit in the Polish capital the Western media was visibly disappointed to a certain extent that the Warsaw Treaty failed to announce a Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary. But how justified was such an approach in the issue of armed forces cuts in Europe?

[Batenin] Since the idea is to draw up the mandate for talks on reducing armed forces and conventional weapons on the entire territory of Europe these issues must be approached on a footing of reciprocity. We believe that they must be dealt with as soon as possible. Some time ago a number of West and East European countries allowed the presence of foreign troops contingents on their territories because of a high level of military confrontation. American and Soviet troops were deployed. Since then the situation has changed considerably especially since 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Union.

The notion of new political thinking has created an entirely new situation along with the moves undertaken by the Warsaw Treaty Organization to reduce weapons and the signing of the INF Treaty. In the circumstances the issue of reducing the foreign military presence in Eastern and Western Europe has come to top the agenda.

Expectations that the Soviet Union should take unilateral steps can be understood to a certain extent. In my opinion, the situation now is close enough to unilateral action where the psychology of the Soviet side is concerned. The stand taken by NATO interferes with such action, however, because it is still based on cold war thinking in some of its elements. NATO is still claiming that a powerful Soviet military presence in Europe is the main factor menacing the West. By the same token I can say that the United States troops stationed in Western Germany are the main factor menacing the East. Clearly both views are not impartial and action must be taken to deal with the problem directly.

In their declaration, the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization reaffirmed their readiness to deal with the issue of the foreign military presence in the nineties and also to deal with the issue of the continued existence of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO.

[Announcer] There inevitably arises the issue of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization making progress toward a purely defensive structure of armed forces and armaments. The confrontation cannot be removed unless such progress is made. What progress has been made? Gen Batenin.

[Batenin] The Warsaw Treaty Organization has adopted a purely defensive military doctrine. NATO is saying that its military doctrine is also a defensive one but this does not follow from the structure of its forces or the nature of exercises they carry out, the more so since NATO is still committed to a flexible response strategy

which provides for using nuclear weapons in an emergency. It also provides for waging a limited nuclear war. All this runs counter to contemporary understanding of the part of nuclear weapons and their nature.

I discern some positive signs in NATO's policymaking circles. We have met with members of the West German Bundeswehr, for instance, and we discussed various ways of creating purely defensive structures on both sides. A transition must be made to a strategy that would rule out large scale offensive operations in principle. That is, of course, a mere declaration as it is. Appropriate action must be taken with respect to altering the structure of troops and the nature of exercises.

U.S. Intentions To Increase SLCM's Viewed
LD3107165988 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in English 1400 GMT 31 Jul 88

[Text] The Soviet Union is rebuilding its foreign policy and in the past 3 years great positive changes have taken place in it. Humanity, says the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, have got much evidence of our determination to persistently translate into life the program of a stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, to carry into effect the ideas of creating a universal security system, a common European home, defense sufficiency and nonaggressive defense, of the settlement of regional conflicts, the withdrawal of troops from the bases on other people's territories and the like.

Eduard Shevardnadze stresses the need to direct efforts to ensuring international security for political interaction of states. This is a very important provision. It should be mentioned that such interactions have already been manifested by the signing of the Soviet-American treaty on scrapping nuclear missiles of two classes. But how are (the events) developing further? The U.S. secretary of defense, Frank Carlucci, declares that at the talks on nuclear and space arms the United States cannot sacrifice the systems required for ensuring stable restraints, specifically such as sea-based cruise missiles, only for the sake of cutting down or control.

The question arises how can one in such a case imagine a future treaty on a 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons? It follows from the American mass media that the Pentagon intends to deploy the Tomahawk missiles at more than 100 submarines, including about 800 nuclear ones. They cannot be excluded from the nuclear equilibrium. To preserve parity, the other side would have to counterbalance these missiles and not necessarily in a mirror way, and it is clear that no reduction of strategic offensive weapons is possible in this case.

We are aware of the American official statements; that is, if the Soviet Union does not give up its demands to limit cruise sea-based missiles the treaty may not take place. How can one assess such statements? As a means for exerting pressure on the Soviet Union, or perhaps as a

preparation of a stronghold for regarding the talks for the period of the change of power in Washington? In any case all this cannot be called goodwill or political interaction. Moreover, there is a certain tradition in this United States stand in relation to all sea-based armaments. It is based on the prerequisite that the United States is a naval power and the Soviet Union is allegedly a ground one. That is why if it comes to arms limitation on sea they must be asymmetric; the Soviet Union must reduce more despite the fact that the supremacy in these arms is on the United States side. Needless to stress that such peculiar logic of the Americans is absolutely unacceptable. Needless to prove that the Soviet Union is a great naval power washed by waters of many seas of three oceans. It is enough to look at the map to become convinced of that, and the length of our sea borders is perhaps bigger than that of the United States.

It is also noteworthy that there are large stockpiles of nuclear bombs at American aircraft carriers, and the range of action of nuclear capable aircraft based on them is up to 3,300 km. The total number of nuclear capable craft on all U.S. strike aircraft carriers is nearing 600. These are verified data and they testify to the United States' unilateral superiority.

What conclusion can be drawn? It seems Mr Carlucci hopes to obtain at the Geneva talks an additional opportunity to build up the strategic superiority the United States already has. But can that promote deepening the positive tendencies in world politics? Certainly not. Neither will the strategic situation be stabilized if the agreement on cutting down strategic offensive weapons by 50 percent does not cover all types of strategic weapons.

The world public are coming out for further advances on the road of disarmament and scrapping nuclear weapons. The road to this objective must be straight.

First Four SS-12's Destroyed at Saryozek

*LD0108093288 Moscow TASS in English
0918 GMT 1 Aug 88*

[Text] Saryozek (Kazakhstan) August 1 TASS—By TASS special correspondents Vladimir Itkin and Gennadiy Talaleev:

The first four Soviet shorter-range missiles, OTR-22, known in the West as SS-12, have been destroyed. This happened today at noon sharp, Moscow time, at the test range in Saryozek, 200 kilometres north west of Alma-Ata. This act, which has no precedent in history, was carried out in accordance with the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty, signed during a visit to Washington last December by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

In three years the Soviet side will eliminate 1,752 deployed and stored missiles, with a range of 500 to 5,500 km. The American side, according to the U.S.

data, will eliminate 859 such missiles. The elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles by the two sides will lead to a substantial lowering of the level of military confrontation in Europe and to the lessening of the risk of global nuclear conflict.

An American inspection team was at the test range to observe the destruction of missiles. The USSR Defense Ministry also provided an opportunity for the representatives of Soviet and foreign public to witness the first ever destruction of Soviet missiles. Saryozek played host to numerous Soviet guests as well as representatives of leading peace movements in the USA and Western Europe, where American Pershing-2 and cruise missiles are sited, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, where Soviet missiles were deployed, as well as from Australia, India, Egypt, Nicaragua, Finland, Canada, Japan and some other international non-governmental organisations.

Foreigners, Reporters Observe

*LD0108144288 Moscow TASS in English
1429 GMT 1 Aug 88*

[Text] Alma-Ata August 1 TASS—Preparatory operations over and people and vehicles safely afar, a pillar of fire and smoke complete with burning metal debris rose today above the test site in Saryozek, Soviet Kazakhstan.

American INF Treaty inspectors, representatives of the world public and Soviet and foreign journalists witnessed the start of the destruction of Soviet SS-12 missiles. The foreign representatives watched all stages of this work: Delivery of the missiles from storage to the elimination area, extraction of rocketry instruments and electric equipment and actions by engineers.

The first shorter-range missiles were unilaterally removed by the Soviet Union from combat duty on the territory of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia and brought here last spring, long before the ratification of the INF Treaty by the U.S. Senate and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Only correspondents from several socialist countries were invited to watch the unloading of the first trainload of missiles. Scientists, ecologists and Soviet journalists attended the testing of the missile destruction technology at the Saryazek test site.

As to the ecological situation, the previous tests showed, one week of daily explosions will release not more substances and gases into the atmosphere than an average thermal power plant in a month of operation. The locality was a good choice, too. The test site is situated in a huge natural depression surrounded with hills. All these factors combined, the least possible damage will be caused to the environment.

Details of SS-12 Missile Destruction Noted

*LD0108205788 Moscow TASS in English
1910 GMT 1 Aug 88*

[Text] Alma-Ata August 1 TASS—TASS special correspondents Vladimir Itkin and Gennadiy Talalayev report: The first shorter-range missiles, which were removed from operational standby, were eliminated at the Soviet military facility in Saryozek, Kazakhstan, today.

The conclusion of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on scrapping intermediate- and shorter-range missiles became possible largely thanks to the anti-war actions of the international public. The mass actions to protest the deployment of new nuclear missiles in Europe, that swept through the European countries, the United States and Canada, demonstrated that the people reject the arms race and demand that their governments take practical measures for disarmament, first and foremost, nuclear disarmament. Therefore, the anti-war peace-making movements and organisations of various orientation welcomed the beginning of Soviet-U.S. negotiations and contributed in every way to their successful completion.

During the summit meeting in Moscow the Soviet Peace Committee organised an international public center to monitor the course of the meeting.

During the official discussion of the Soviet-U.S. treaty in the USSR Supreme Soviet the Soviet Peace Committee organised one more discussion—a public one during which the idea was launched of supplementing an official inspection with an international public monitoring of the implementation by both sides of the INF Treaty.

The Soviet Peace Committee approached the USSR Defence Ministry with the request to afford representatives of the foreign and Soviet public an opportunity to be present at the first action of the elimination of missiles under the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty. It received the affirmative answer.

Journalists were given an opportunity to inspect the missiles which will cease to exist later. There are four SS-12 missiles at the site. Briquettes of explosives are seen along the perimeter and body of the weapons. Representatives of the U.S. team of inspectors who arrived here to monitor the work inspected the four missiles and the explosion site. U.S. military inspectors speak highly of the skill, promptness and conscientiousness in the handling of the work by the Soviet side.

Michael Hritsik, lieutenant-colonel of the U.S. Air Force who heads the team of inspectors, told TASS that it was a great honour for him to witness such a historic event. He said he could not even suppose it a year ago. Excellent working and living conditions were created for them. The Americans saw for themselves that the process to prepare the missiles for destruction undergoes according to the plan.

None of the representatives of the U.S. mass media arrived in Saryozek. They alluded to the visit of the U.S. Secretary of Defence Frank Carlucci to the USSR. But dozens of other foreign correspondents were present here. They arrived in the Kazakhstan steppe on the invitation of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

The missiles were destroyed in the presence of representatives of the public of various countries, who could observe the process to prepare and destroy these missiles by the explosion method, Viktor Karpov, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Directorate on Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament, told the TASS correspondents.

This is the first official act of the destruction of missiles. It will be followed by others. All missiles of both intermediate and shorter ranges should be destroyed within the three-year time frame. This act sets the beginning to the process whose irreversibility should be guaranteed not only by the INF Treaty but also by a Soviet-U.S. treaty on slashing by half strategic offensive armaments, which is being elaborated now. If the efforts to conclude a treaty on a 50 percent reduction succeed in the near future, this will signal one more major breakthrough in lessening the nuclear threat looming large over mankind.

Moscow TV Shows Missiles' End

*LD0108204188 Moscow Television Service in Russian
1700 GMT 1 Aug 88*

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report by unidentified correspondent]

[Excerpts] [Correspondent] The planned elimination of shorter-range missiles began today in the region of Saryozek, Kazakh SSR, in accordance with the Soviet-U.S. treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

This is the former missile base of Saryozek, near the Kazakh city of Taldy-Kurgan. Like the trunks of felled trees, here are the shorter-range OTR-22 and OTR-23 missiles and their containers. Here in Saryozek, these missiles will be destroyed over the course of the next 18 months. The first four of these missiles are being blown up today—OTR-22 shorter-range missiles. [video shows journalists filming the missiles; shots of missiles lying on the ground; four other missiles seen lying further afield] The first peaceful explosion of missiles is being conducted not only under the supervision of officials, but also of the public. Representatives of the largest and most influential antiwar organizations from 17 countries, 4 international organizations, and the Soviet Peace Committee have been invited to Saryozek.

[Lieutenant Colonel A.I. Borodin, identified by caption] On this day, 1 August, our missile and aviation base is beginning the elimination of shorter-range missiles. The military personnel, as well as everyone else, understand this responsible task, this task of the state. And we will fulfill the task successfully.

[Correspondent] Following tense expectation—a missile explosion, which evokes not fear, but joy. For mankind's treasured dream has come true; the first step has been taken from the nuclear abyss along the road to a world without weapons of mass destruction. This is the crater after today's explosion of missiles, and this is what was left of these missiles: fragments. The whole of mankind hopes that there will be many more of these fragments instead of missiles. [video shows explosion in the distance, journalists applauding, and correspondent showing a fragment of one of the missiles]

U.S. Inspectors Monitor Event

*LD0108205188 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1800 GMT 1 Aug 88*

[Text] The USSR has shown an example of a constructive approach toward solving international problems. Representatives of the world public and foreign journalists, who have arrived in the Saryozek region to observe the start of the planned elimination of shorter-range missiles, have again convinced themselves of this. Representatives of international and national peace organizations and Soviet and foreign journalists are interested in literally everything: how the technological process of destroying the missiles was worked out; how effective is verification [kontrol]; and the possible consequences of the explosions. Militarily precise and exhaustive replies are forthcoming to all questions.

It is becoming clear, for instance, that, as test explosions have shown, the quantity of various substances and gases emitted into the atmosphere over a week is smaller than is the case with a medium-capacity heat and power station operating over a 1-month period. As has been provided for in the treaty, U.S. inspectors are monitoring the event to ensure that the conditions for eliminating the shorter-range carrier missiles are strictly adhered to.

Thus, this truly historic event has been accomplished. The practical implementation of the Soviet-U.S. treaty has begun.

Karpov Comments on 'Explosion'

PM0208104588 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 2 Aug 88 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report "for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA": "Explosion at Saryozek: Practical Implementation of Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles"]

[Excerpt] Kazakh SSR—The events taking place in Saryozek have been commented on by V. P. Karpov, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Administration for Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament.

"The first four OTR-22 missiles due for elimination under the provisions of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles were

destroyed today. This took place in the presence of representatives of the public of various countries, who were able to observe the process of preparing and destroying these missiles by means of explosion. It is the first official act of missile destruction. Others will follow. All intermediate- and shorter-range missiles are to be destroyed over 3 years.

"What do we see as the significance of this first official act of destruction? We see it as laying the foundation for a process whose irreversibility must be guaranteed not only by the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles but by the Soviet-U.S. treaty to halve strategic offensive arms currently being drafted. If a treaty to halve armaments is concluded soon, it will mark yet another major breakthrough in reducing the nuclear threat to mankind.

"Experience in eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range missiles should facilitate the drafting of provisions on the reduction of strategic offensive armaments. We regard the successful implementation of the provisions of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles as a guarantee of the successful solution of the problems of strategic offensive arms."

Nazarkin on Progress Toward Chemical Weapons Ban

*PM0108160588 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Aug 88 First Edition p 4*

[Interview with Yu. K. Nazarkin, head of the Soviet delegation at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, by own correspondent B. Dubrovin: "'To Realize Favorable Conditions,' Head of the Soviet Delegation at the Disarmament Conference Says"; date not given—first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Geneva, Aug—The summer session of the Disarmament Conference is taking place in Geneva's Palais des Nations. PRAVDA correspondent B. Dubrovin asked Yu. K. Nazarkin, ambassador for special assignments and head of the Soviet delegation, to answer some questions.

[Dubrovin] The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference pointed out as one of the achievements of Soviet foreign policy the fact that the talks on chemical arms have been shifted to the practical plane. How do things now stand in this area?

[Nazarkin] The talks resumed comparatively recently—7 July. In point of fact, the entire round lies ahead. At the same time, important events have occurred in international life. Above all, the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. I also have in mind the third UN General Assembly special session on disarmament. Questions of a chemical weapons ban occupied an important place both at the meeting of the top Soviet and U.S. leaders and at the session at the United Nations' New York headquarters. The joint top-level statement in Moscow emphasized the lasting urgency of concluding an effective convention on an all-embracing, truly global ban on chemical weapons subject to efficient verification and covering all states

that are capable of having such weapons. We sense here in practice the stimulating impact of that statement. Thus, the Geneva talks have resumed under very favorable political conditions. It is important now to realize these conditions and to translate them into the language of specific accords on those questions that still remain unresolved. This is all the more important because the priority nature of this task was confirmed at the Warsaw conference of the Warsaw Pact states' Political Consultative Committee.

Among the things on which agreement has not yet been reached at the Geneva forum I would name, above all, the problem of excluding the production of chemical weapons in commercial industry. It is a complex problem if only because it requires the creation of a setup which will be effective from the viewpoint of preventing the creation [sozdaniye] of chemical weapons and which will not, at the same time, hinder the normal development of peaceful sectors of the chemical industry. But the chief thing is the political aspect of this question: Here we have to deal with different forms of ownership—private and state. In other words, this is a sphere in which differences in states' social systems have a direct impact.

There is still no agreement on the procedure for destroying stocks of chemical weapons and the enterprises which produce them. In elaborating this procedure it is important to carefully observe the principle of not harming the states' security.

And, finally, some aspects of verification still remain. The procedures for conducting inspections on demand are being formulated here.

[Dubrovin] Mention was made at the 19th party conference of certain miscalculations in our foreign policy, as a result of which we let ourselves be drawn into the arms race. Does this apply to the sphere of chemical weapons?

[Nazarkin] Yes. The arms race spread to this sphere as well. And here, too, resolute actions were required of our side to overcome many stereotypes which fettered our potential. We have ceased producing chemical weapons, had recourse to considerable openness in associated issues, and managed to resolve many complex questions which were slowing down the progress of the talks, particularly in the sphere of verification.

[Dubrovin] But is it really possible to claim that the race in the sphere of chemical arms has ended after the United States quite recently began production of binary arms?

[Nazarkin] That is not what I am claiming. I am only saying that our side has taken decisive actions to put an end to this race. In addition to the production of binary weapons in the United States, there have also been reports that some other countries are manufacturing or preparing to manufacture chemical weapons. Reports on the use of chemical weapons and, what is more, on a massive scale entailing large numbers of casualties

among the civilian population are a source of great concern. In our view, in order to put an end to this very dangerous development of events, the most radical, direct course of action is to do our utmost to speed up the conclusion of a convention on totally and comprehensively banning chemical weapons. It goes without saying that such a convention must embrace all types of chemical weapons, including binary weapons.

[Dubrovin] In the recess between rounds of the multilateral talks on banning chemical weapons, Soviet and British delegations visited military chemical bases at Porton Down and Shikhany respectively. Having visited both installations, what is your opinion of this? What impact has it had on the multilateral talks, which have now resumed? And in general, what is your view of the significance of this kind of bilateral exchange?

[Nazarkin] If the talks are to be successful, then it is very important that mutual trust between the participants develop and strengthen. The visits to the military chemical installations you mentioned are one way of strengthening this trust. After all, when the British delegation visited Shikhany, the doors of every depot, laboratory, bunker, and so forth were open to it. What was the point of doing this? First and foremost, to ensure that our guests could see for themselves that we, the Soviet Union, have really made the political decision to ban chemical weapons. I must also say that when we visited Porton Down the British side was completely open and showed us everything we wanted to see. This general aspect—building trust—is unquestionably very important.

I can also say that, as a direct participant in the talks, it was exceptionally useful for me to be able to see with my own eyes what we intend to ban, for example. I will also give you this example: During the British delegation's visit to Shikhany, it was basically given the opportunity to carry out inspections on demand; that is, it was able to visit any point within the confines of the installation—and it covers quite a large area if you include the test sites, depots, laboratories, various auxiliary units, and so forth. Some interesting questions arose, and these, of course, must be considered during the talks.

[Dubrovin] When, in your opinion, will the convention be concluded?

[Nazarkin] The Soviet side has expressed willingness to conclude the convention this year. This has also been said by official representatives of a number of other states, and by H.-D. Genscher, FRG vice chancellor and foreign minister, in particular. But the process of the talks is not moving smoothly—there are shoals and reefs. Forty states are taking part in the talks and unfortunately not all of them are inclined to speed up the process of concluding a convention. They cite technical difficulties which must be resolved at the talks and internal political factors. Of course, all this must be taken into account but, at the same time, the delaying of the talks cannot be justified by these factors. I repeat—our desire for the earliest possible conclusion of a convention remains unchanged.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Defense Minister Views Disarmament Tasks

AU1907095688 Bonn DIE WELT in German
16-17 Jul 88 p 5

[Article by Defense Minister Rupert Scholz: "Conventional Disarmament Is Now the Main Task; We Must Demand the Speedy Preparation of a Security Concept"]

[Text] The debate on disarmament, arms control, and new security structures in Europe has been set into motion. After the successful conclusion of the INF Treaty and recognizable progress in the START negotiations to reduce strategic nuclear weapons, conventional disarmament is the next task, which is central for Europe in the international disarmament process; for in this field the Warsaw Pact still maintains a grave and massive superiority in the number of troops, as well as in the quantity of arms.

In tanks and artillery the Warsaw Pact is far superior to NATO. The Warsaw Pact remains capable of surprise attack and invasion, and there are still military imbalances which can no longer be accepted—a statement that is still valid, despite the positive political signals emanating from Moscow. The Soviet Union, even under Gorbachev, is still continuing its conventional armament, and has even increased existing superiorities. The volume, the level of armament, the spatial and temporal deployment, and a continuing offensive military doctrine substantiate the unchanged threat to Western Europe. In other words, this confirms the urgent need for effective disarmament negotiations, but requires, above all, the convening of the planned conference on conventional arms control in Europe, as soon as possible.

Gorbachev's latest statements allow for a certain degree of optimism for such disarmament negotiations, although we must maintain a strict degree of sobriety and realism. However, some people, especially in this country, are increasingly losing the latter quality. For many, realistic analyses and consistent definitions of concepts are being replaced by euphoric feelings and many inadequately contemplated visions; for some people, disarmament and more security seem to have been attained by mere words. However, in the vital field of security, disarmament, and arms control, not words but—hopefully soon—actions count.

Concepts like that of a "security partnership" between East and West and ideas about certain zones in central Europe with reduced armament (particularly a nuclear-free zone), which have been pursued in the talks between the SPD and the SED, illustrate the dubious character of such inadequately contemplated visions. Even if such zones are not yet intended to signify the first steps toward neutralism, which is unacceptable, they would evidently endanger the security situation of the West, especially that of the FRG. For the FRG, which literally is in the frontline in the East-West conflict and European

division, must continue to insist on—via the concept of forward defense [Vorne-Verteidigung]—the Western alliance protecting our territorial integrity directly and without restrictions, so that this territory is not regarded and treated as a lower-quality military zone of protection and action. In Germany, the Atlantic community of defense, responsibility, and risk-taking must stand its most immediate test and apply itself to daily life.

For the same reason, every kind of denuclearization and the so-called third zero option must be excluded. Without an effective nuclear arms arsenal, the security of Western Europe cannot be guaranteed. Nuclear arms are—in contrast to conventional arms—ultimately and above all political weapons and make it literally impossible to wage war because, from the beginning they expose the aggressor to the risk of his own, infernal destruction. Nuclear deterrence practically eliminates war as a "means of politics"; and this is the special political and ultimately moral justification of nuclear arms. In contrast to this, conventional arms facilitate the waging of wars because they make military victories in the classical sense possible. Therefore, in addition to the conventional defense capability, the component of nuclear deterrence must always be preserved.

On the other hand, this does not alter the fact that further steps of disarmament are imperative in the nuclear sector. The objective of the START negotiations to reduce, in a balanced way, the strategic nuclear weapons on both sides to upper limits which are as low as possible, is of great importance and is apt to increasingly commit nuclear deterrence to the principle of more mutual security by means of fewer weapons. For years, NATO has systematically reduced the number of its nuclear weapons—a course of action that should also be expected from the Eastern side.

Nuclear battlefield weapons, which are relatively less important—taking longer-range nuclear weapons as the standard—will also be an important topic for the further development because nuclear battlefield weapons are relatively closely linked to conventional weapons and the related possibility of actual warfare. On the whole, security in Europe can only be guaranteed on the basis of a balanced combination of nuclear and conventional means. Whoever—in light of the striking conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact—wants to declare the FRG part of a central European "nuclear-free zone," as proposed above all by the SPD and the SED, wants to expose it to a truly irresponsible security risk: that is, that of a war which can be waged again and which becomes more feasible.

Disarmament should always lead to more security, not reduce it. More security will be achieved through disarmament, if a secure and stable balance, above all of conventional armed forces—and at the lowest possible level—is established and if the Eastern side foregoes its still existing ability to carry out surprise attacks and large-scale offensives. In concrete terms, this means that

the Warsaw Pact's elementary superiority—particularly in the area of tanks and artillery—must be eliminated. The Soviet concession of adequate disparities in Europe and the profession of the principle of asymmetric disarmament give rise to hope in this direction. Both are old Western demands which, however, Moscow has so far ignored. In the contrary statements which have now been made, above all by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, there is an important and encouraging approach to disarmament negotiations which could achieve these goals.

To prepare for this, a concept of mutual security has to be speedily developed by the West. Accordingly, NATO and the individual member states are working on an adequate total concept—a work, however, which must be quickly concluded. The FRG has to express its vital interest in such an acceleration; and, therefore, the FRG must quickly apply its own ideas in the necessary voting procedure with our alliance partners.

In this total concept it is necessary to eliminate the existing disparities in the given level of armaments, then to achieve efficient arms reductions on both sides, and finally to ensure effective and reliable verification and control procedures. Efficient conventional disarmament must involve the entire area from the Urals to the Atlantic, while regional disparities, however, must also be taken into account. The same applies to the strategic and tactical options, as well as to the equally important factors of capabilities in spatial and temporal deployment.

The mere reduction of troop strengths or certain arms in equal numbers on both sides does not constitute an efficient proposal for disarmament. If, for example, the Soviet side proposed that the two alliance systems should reduce their troops by 500,000 men, this would not be the basis for more security and more stability but of more danger and less stability. In the case of such equal and general reductions, the inferiority of the Western alliance would increase while Eastern superiority would not only increase in proportion but would also be perpetuated in reality. Therefore, before achieving a mutually equal reduction, existing disparities must be eliminated; that is, Warsaw Pact armaments must be reduced to the NATO level—or at least close to it.

In addition to disarmament in the nuclear and conventional sector, the third field of tasks is the implementation of a ban on chemical weapons. Although it should be very easy to achieve abstract unity here, in this sector the problems of verification are great and concrete. Even the storage and production of conventional chemical weapons is very difficult to control; and with the new technologies of binary chemical weapons the chemical agent is even only directly produced as the weapon is being used (launched). However, notwithstanding such difficulties, effective control mechanisms must also be sought in this field.

But it takes more than disarmament to achieve mutual security in Europe. Disarmament only conveys more security, if the previously mentioned requirements have been met. Real mutual security in Europe is ultimately only possible on the basis of general political detente. Accordingly, disarmament policy can only be part of a general policy of detente, but disarmament cannot replace general detente. Although populist or precipitate visionary voices do not want to realize it, so long as there are political tensions in a divided Europe, there will also be security problems. Thus, the best way toward effective disarmament is the one that leads to real detente.

Security in Europe is based not only on military factors but also on general political, economic, and especially humanitarian ones. In an undivided Europe, in which all people can exchange ideas and information without hindrance, in which all people are able to protect their basic civil and human rights and determine their own future, there will be neither security nor armament problems. Accordingly, the policy of disarmament is part of the total framework of a policy of general political detente, of the increased dialogue in the East-West relationship, and a policy that leads to the universal observance of human rights and basic freedoms.

For example, as long as people who do not want to avail themselves of anything but their right to freedom of movement are shot at in Germany, one cannot talk of real and stable detente. Basically, political disarmament starts with each individual, with each European and his right of self-determination. Acceptance of the principles of freedom, self-determination, and independence thus constitute the most important maxim that should serve as a guideline for the entire policy of detente in Europe. If real progress is achieved in this field, many problems of European security will automatically be settled.

In terms of concepts, this means for the West that it has to base its policy of detente, security, and disarmament on a broad foundation—a foundation that the people in Eastern Europe also expect us to respect and maintain.

Dregger Assesses Pact Proposals Positively
AU2007131488 Frankfurt/Main *FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE* in German 20 Jul 88 p 2

[“F.Y.” article: “Dregger in Favor of NATO Concept”]

[Text] In the most favorable reaction so far from the CDU/CSU camp, CDU/CSU Bundestag group chairman Dregger commented on the Warsaw Pact proposals for comprehensive disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals. A statement made by Dregger on Tuesday [19 July] says that what is interesting about the Warsaw Pact's proposals is the fact that they have been presented in an overall context, “similar to the way it must be done with the overall concept for security and disarmament to be prepared by NATO.” Dregger urged the NATO bodies to complete this overall concept which was commissioned as early as July 1987.

He said that what is striking about the Warsaw statement is the relevance of the text and the renunciation of propaganda, as well as the fact that it adopts Western basic positions which in the past have been rejected by the Warsaw Pact. He said the question is whether a revision of Soviet foreign policy is in the offing, comparable to the change that caused Moscow to return to the Geneva negotiation table. If the Warsaw Pact is serious about its declared goals—asymmetrical disarmament to equal ceilings below the present armament level, and creation of an armed forces structure allowing only defense and no longer attack—conventional disarmament in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals will become a real possibility. "Then nuclear disarmament, including the short-range systems, can also be continued, while the security of all parties concerned will be preserved. Then NATO could come closer to the disarmament objective that the Germans consider most important: the elimination of the Warsaw Pact's capability of invasion," says Dregger's statement.

The Federal Government will have to contribute its share to working out the overall concept, Dregger says. On this basis, the mandate for negotiations on the objectives accepted by the Warsaw Pact can be adopted in Vienna. Only these negotiations can show whether Gorbachev and the Warsaw Pact are serious about their proposals. Dregger said critically that the credibility of these proposals can grow, if the Warsaw Pact stops intensifying conventional armament which it has continuously stepped up in the past, and if the Soviet Union unilaterally reduces armament in all those areas where it is vastly superior to the West. For example, Moscow could unilaterally renounce several thousand short-range nuclear missiles, without giving up its superiority in this area.

Scholz Welcomes Pact Disarmament Proposals
LD2307143888 Hamburg DPA in German
1144 GMT 23 Jul 88

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Defense Minister Rupert Scholz today welcomed the Warsaw Pact's latest disarmament proposals. Scholz said in an interview for Sender Freies Berlin (SFB) radio that "quite important advances" have become visible in the most recent ideas and signals from the East. This is especially the case regarding the admission that in comparison with NATO the East is excessively armed in many areas. If the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact states now accept the West's long-standing demand that the East must disarm to a greater extent than the West (asymmetrical disarmament), "then that is very important and of course encouraging for us," Scholz said.

The defense minister is also confident that the NATO states could very soon submit a joint concept for further East-West negotiations. The fact that the U.S. presidential elections are due in November does not make the West incapable of action.

Scholz Expects Early Drafting of NATO Concept
AU2507135288 Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 25 Jul 88 p 2

[F.Y. article: "Scholz Expects Early Drafting of Overall NATO Concept"]

[Text] Bonn, 24 July—Defense Minister Scholz expects a "rapid conclusion" of internal efforts by NATO to draft an overall concept regarding disarmament and security policy. In a talk with SENDER FREIES BERLIN, he hinted that he considers possible the drafting of the concept as the basis for further disarmament negotiations while the current U.S. Administration is still in office. Scholz gave an affirmative answer to the question of whether the West must become active now, after it has called for deeds from the East in the past. In last weekend's Warsaw Pact statement there "was considerable progress," Scholz pointed out. In this statement the Warsaw Pact explicitly acknowledged the imbalance of conventional weapons and the necessity of asymmetrical disarmament measures. This is encouraging and will be taken up, he stated. But, first of all, steps will be taken by the Soviet Union to stop the arms buildup that was continued after Gorbachev took office. Scholz viewed it as a positive sign that the Eastern alliance accepted the principle of human rights in its Warsaw statement. This gives rise to hopes that it will be possible to conclude the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting shortly. "I hope that with some optimism we can expect a successful and quick termination of the talks, and then I think conventional disarmament will soon be tackled, which today is the most important sphere of disarmament," Scholz stressed.

Asked whether he thinks that negotiations on the elimination of short-range nuclear missiles in Europe should be held at the same time as talks on conventional disarmament, or whether they should be conducted at a later date, Scholz avoided a clear answer. NATO is based on the need to be able to defend itself. And because of the Warsaw Pact's superiority in the conventional sphere in particular, the main point of emphasis must be conventional disarmament. In his view, short-range nuclear missiles are currently not a top-priority problem. He spoke of their "specific necessity" on the basis of present-day facts of defense policy. If conditions should change, it will be possible to "discuss various points."

Scholz confirmed that during his term of office as defense minister he will "never" neglect the Berlin and Germany policy, because it is dear to his heart. "This is a question of principle for me. And for this very reason I will not abandon this sphere. Regarding my task, I consider it logical that the links with the Germany policy must not be abandoned, because if one knows that Germany policy and Berlin policy are essential aspects of the policy of detente, and if one bears in mind that the policy of detente is indivisibly linked with security

policy, one will easily recognize that in my present capacity I will continue to be directly confronted with these issues," Scholz pointed out.

Genscher Comments on NATO Disarmament Plan

LD2507123188 Hamburg DPA in German
1036 GMT 25 Jul 88

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—According to Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), the East is now prepared to rethink to give Europe more security through conventional disarmament. Genscher will visit Moscow for political consultations in a week's time. The approximation of Western positions, expressed in the statement of the Warsaw Pact summit conference, is remarkable, Genscher stated today in a signed article published by the Foreign Ministry. However, in this wide-ranging survey of disarmament objectives, Genscher also emphasized the dependency of the start of negotiations on the satisfactory outcome of the Vienna CSCE review conference. It is "now urgently necessary not to waste any time, and to concentrate all efforts upon this."

The most important items of the Western negotiation plan are first, the establishment of a secure and stable equilibrium at a low level; second, the removal of the imbalances; and, third, and most important, the removal of the capability for a surprise attack and territory-seizing offensive.

However, the safeguarding of the nonaggression capability requires more than mere numerical reductions, Genscher underlined. From the Western conceptions, which, it is hoped will be included in the expected NATO "total concept," Genscher emphasized, two details. Asymmetrical reductions in East and West, and artillery, are to be the objective of disarmament. Furthermore, the West would urge that armed forces would be deployed outside one's own territory only under certain restrictions. Future negotiations on conventional stability in Europe would have to be based on "a common understanding of the role of the armed forces," Genscher noted. Only thus could the gradual development of cooperative structures transpire. In this connection the foreign minister considered the discussion of military doctrines important. From this would have to emerge the "exclusively defensive terms of reference" for the armed forces. The nonaggression capability, as defined by Genscher, "must find visible expression in the extent, equipment, deployment, and command policies."

DIE WELT Comments

AU2607092888 Bonn DIE WELT in German
26 Jul 88 p 1

[Ulrich Reitz report: "Genscher Presents Concept for NATO; Response to Gorbachev's Proposals; 'Equal Maximum Strengths in Major Combat Equipment'"]

[Excerpt] Bonn—In the struggle for a NATO conventional disarmament concept Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has come forward: He has resorted to

the unusual instrument of a "personally signed article" distributed by the Foreign Ministry in Bonn. Its title is: "More Security with Conventional Disarmament. The Western Concept." This is how Genscher has reacted to the SPD's insistence on providing an answer for the Warsaw Pact. Apparently in view of reproaches that the West was facing Gorbachev's advances helplessly, the vice chancellor is now taking the initiative.

The Federal Government, Genscher writes, wants to see "the armed forces of both sides in Europe" no longer capable of surprise attacks and large-scale offensives, as "is already the case in the West." The Warsaw Pact has declared its readiness to reduce imbalances. Genscher's conclusion: The strength of the armed forces has to be reduced, but at the same time something must be done about the structure of the armed forces (armament, deployment, and degree of readiness). Genscher expects the East to cut their armored and mechanized combat units, reduce the number of tanks, armored infantry combat vehicles, and artillery. The goal is "equal maximum strength in major combat equipment."

However, this alone is insufficient. Stability must be increased by restricting the possibility of concentrating the remaining armed forces at will. The armed forces on foreign territory are of "special importance." Genscher states: "Therefore, the Western proposal for negotiations will provide for specific restrictions on the deployment of armed forces outside their own territory." This is aimed at the Soviets and the Americans.

In the interest of further stabilization, Genscher calls for the operational capabilities of the armies to be restricted. This proposal is aimed at rendering surprise attacks more difficult without decreasing the defender's ability to react. There must not be "zones of different security" in Europe.

From the "many years of unsuccessful discussion about data" at the conventional MBFR negotiations in Vienna the lesson has to be drawn that from now on the exchange of data on the armed forces will be discussed in parallel and not dealt with first. "Result-oriented proposals" have to be "the focus."

Teltschik Previews Kohl's Moscow Talks

LD2707132588 Hamburg DPA in German
1236 GMT 27 Jul 88

[Excerpts] Bonn, (DPA)—Disarmament and arms control will form one of the central themes of the visit by Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl to Moscow planned for 24-27 October. As Kohl's foreign policy adviser Horst Teltschik told DPA today, Kohl will also explain German ideas on disarmament in the conventional area within this framework. The chancellor, like Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, starts from the

premise that the West should not wait with the presentation of a specific negotiating proposal until the presentation of a total NATO concept—which observers do not see appearing until next year.

Teltschik stated that since the Federal Security Council has already issued guide lines for the Federal Government on the conventional disarmament sector, Kohl will be able to discuss Bonn's ideas with Gorbachev. In the federal government's opinion, the aim of east-west negotiations must be to reduce the invasion capability of the Warsaw Pact step by step. This includes the removal of the capability for surprise attack and for a territory-seizing offensive operation.

According to Bonn's ideas, the forces in the whole of Europe have to be included. However, specific measures should be envisaged for various parts of regions which do justice to the relevant threat situation.

Genscher To Meet Gorbachev in Moscow 30 July
AU2807104088 Bonn *DIE WELT* in German
28 Jul 88 p 8

[Bernt Conrad report from Bonn: "Gorbachev Postpones Travel Plans on Account of Genscher's Visit to Moscow; After Conference Marathon of the East; Preparation for a Visit of the Chancellor in Autumn"]

[Excerpt] In his talks with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, Genscher will comment positively on the Warsaw Pact's proposals on conventional disarmament, which, in his opinion, come close to Western positions in the main points. At the same time, he will refer to the willingness to speedily conclude the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting, which was announced in the Warsaw Pact summit communique, and demand appropriate actions.

Daily Calls for NATO Unity: 'No New Yalta'
AU0108141988 Frankfurt/Main *FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE* in German 30-31 Jul 88 p 1

[Jan Reifenberg commentary: "No New Yalta"]

[Text] Since 1986 NATO's "High Level Task Force" has been trying to make progress in Brussels with the negotiations on reducing the conventional imbalance from the Atlantic to the Urals. Even though considerable progress has been made at the preliminary talks of the 23 representatives of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Vienna, the dispute over the autonomy of the future negotiations and the form in which the difficult topic of dual capable systems can be tackled still has to be solved.

France insists on the autonomy of its own national nuclear weapons. The FRG wants to postpone as long as possible the answer to the question of whether modernization of nuclear battlefield and short-range weapons will be necessary in the future, too, and is toying with the idea of holding separate negotiations on this topic. Its

urging for a speedy conclusion of the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting, by which negotiations on conventional stability could be started in the fall, can be explained by this. The three nuclear partners, too, accord utmost importance to the future negotiations on conventional arms control. But they do not consider their course, which is decisive for Europe's future security, bound to the partners' domestic policy time constraints.

It is NATO's fault that Gorbachev is dominating the public with pleasant-sounding proposals, thus giving rise to the impression that the Kremlin is the only one with the willingness for innovation and the initiative to eliminate tensions in Europe. This makes us forget that it was particularly the internal steadfastness of the Western alliance that facilitated the INF Treaty on the worldwide elimination of an entire category of nuclear weapons. Now, the same power of decision is necessary. Only then can the Soviet Union be prevented from using the new negotiations to separate America and its NATO partners and to safeguard its geostrategic advantages on the old continent.

Advance performances, such as smaller zones on both sides of the dividing line between East and West, and militarily dubious bartering, such as the exchange of planes for tanks, are useless. The West has to think about how it can make the Warsaw Pact reduce its capability for invasion in a verifiable manner and renounce its arms buildup, which has long been above and beyond the Soviet Union's legitimate security needs. In this connection, the West must never overlook that the Soviet Armed Forces would have to advance only about 800 km to the west in order to regain their current positions; the United States, however, would have to transport troops, once withdrawn from Europe, over 6,000 km.

Gorbachev has proposed a schedule: data exchange, troop reduction, and establishment of a balance that serves only defensive needs but does not provide the capability to attack. Most people in the West think that these ideas are new. But these are proposals that the West has made over almost 15 years of futile negotiations on "mutual and balanced force reduction in Central Europe" in Vienna. NATO, however, is obviously unable to effectively demonstrate its own success; it allows it to be taken from its hands. It is extremely difficult to achieve a consensus among the 16 sovereign alliance partners. The Europeans are not able to credibly demonstrate their importance in world politics. They sway between concern about a waning U.S. commitment to the defense of Western Europe and the reservations resulting from the unsolved German question, which is the core of the great controversy.

In the meantime, U.S.-Soviet contacts are intensifying. The chiefs of the general staffs and the defense ministers of the two superpowers have become acquainted and appreciate each other on a personal level. They are willing to brief each other on strategy, on doctrines, and on the material contents of these doctrines. Why, Crowe

and Akhromeyev ask, should regular contacts of the military not achieve that understanding which has been impossible because of decades of distrust as a result of the division of Europe? The NATO partners should not complain that they are being passed over, and that a "new Yalta" is in the works. The two superpowers will always initially act alone when their supreme national interests are at stake and will brief the partners only after final results have been achieved.

The negotiations on conventional armament are a unique chance to bring Europe's weight to bear. It is necessary to take Gorbachev at his word: First, the exchange of data has to be established, which will show to all the world the disparity between East and West if on-site verification can be ensured. Then agreement can be reached on the form, modalities, and contents of the reduction of tanks, artillery, armored infantry combat vehicles, planes, and troops.

In the end, a state of non-attack capability of both sides is to be reached. This will take years. There will be many setbacks on the path toward this goal. Success can be achieved only if the close links across the Atlantic are maintained and only if the political tension, which is the reason for the arms buildup, is gradually reduced. The unity of NATO is required now more than ever before.

SPD's Vogel Urges Peacetime Military Reduction
LD3107101088 Hamburg DPA in German
0832 GMT 31 Jul 88

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—SPD Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel has spoken in support of a reduction in the

peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr, which currently has 495,000 men. One ought not to cling to this number, Vogel told the German Press Agency (DPA) Sunday. It is better to maintain a lower numerical strength with a reasonable expenditure so that the soldiers can be better motivated and their social problems better solved.

In Vogel's view the current numerical strength is still underpinned by an early warning period which "stems from the coldest times in the cold war". Early warning periods of 24-48 hours are out of date. If the numerical strength of the armed forces were doubled or tripled, the possibilities of falling back on the reserves in an emergency would appear in a different light.

It is the conviction of the SPD leader that a realization of his party's disarmament proposals would lead to the Federal Republic's expenditure no longer continuing to grow as before but being "stabilized and then lowered by percentages." He also expects an effect from symbolic acts, such as the demand already raised several times by the SPD, for cutting the defense budget by 1 billion marks. His party followed with interest the discussions in the FDP ranks for cuts in the defense budget.

It is not illusory to believe that a lot of money could be saved by means of disarmament. Savings in the arms expenditure in East and West to the tune of only 3-4 percent could finance a worldwide aid program, which would exceed the dimension of the U.S. Marshall Plan for Europe after the war, the SPD chairman opined.

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